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INTRODUCTION

Year after year, Ombudsman proposals have been introduced in a
majority of the state legislatures in the United States.' Legislation has
been passed for state-wide Ombudsmen in Hawaii, Nebraska, Iowa, and
Alaska. 2 The word "Ombudsman," Swedish in origin, means an office
* Ph.B., Muhlenberg College; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Member of the Pennsylvania
Bar; Chairman, Ombudsman Committee, International Bar Association; and Chairman, Ombudsman Committee, Section of Administrative Law, American Bar Association.
** These topics are the 23 sections of the ABA Model Act.
1. ABA OMBUDSMAN COMM.,

DEVELOPMENT REP. 12-14 (1971-1972),

28-34 (1972-1973);

IBA-ABA OMBUDSMAN COMM. DEVELOPMENT REP. 24-31 (1973-1974).
2. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 96-1 et seq. (1968) (some portions were amended in 1974; see
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 96-1 et seq. (Supp. 1974)) [hereinafter referred to as the Hawaii statute];
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8, 240 et seq. (Supp. 1969) [hereinafter referred to as the Nebraska
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established by the legislature or parliament and headed by an independent, high-level public official who receives complaints from aggrieved
persons against government agencies, officials, and employees; conducts
an investigation; and, if the complaints are justified, recommends corrective action. The major reasons for the Ombudsman institution include: 3
1. The modern state, large and complex, has assumed a multitude of functions resulting from social and welfare legislation. Extensive powers and discretion have been given to government agencies
and officials. The individual must be protected against administrative
mistake and abuse of power.
2. The traditional concern for the guaranty of the rights of the
individual has become even greater in modern society. The activities
of public administration have become so comprehensive and the power
of the bureaucracy so great that the status of the individual needs
additional protection.
3. The growth of government prevents communication between it
and the individual. The Ombudsman tends to humanize the bureaucracy to some extent and gives the individual a sense of relationship
with his government.
4. Existing mechanisms for adjusting grievances are inadequate.
(a) The legislator has limited funds and little or no staff, does
not have direct access to information and files, lacks the time and
expertise, and is not known to many of his constituents as being
available for such assistance; his role, in addition, is affected by political considerations.
(b) Courts do play a major role in the correction of abuses by
government. But litigation is expensive, tension-creating, and slowmoving. Courts may be precluded from hearing appeals either by law
or by technicalities. Review of administrative acts is limited. Courts
are basically adversary party proceedings which must operate
formally-restricted by rules for the production of evidence.
(c) Administrative agencies may have, within their structure,
channels for complaint, but lack independence and impartiality.
(d) Political considerations may prevent the complainant
from obtaining a fair resolution of his grievance from the office of the
statute]; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601G. 1 et seq. (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as the Iowa

statute]; Ombudsman Act, LAWS OF ALASKA ch. 32 (1975). The three present state-wide Om-

budsmen are: in Hawaii, Herman S. Doi; in Nebraska, Murrell B. McNeil; and in Iowa, Thomas R.
Mayer. The Alaska legislation was passed after this article was written and, therefore, will not be
discussed. This list of Ombudsmen does not include complaint-handling offices established by
executive action, correctional institutional complaint-handling officials whether created by the
legislature or the executive, and several Lieutenant Governors who by legislative action or on their
own initiative handle complaints.
3. Frank, The Ombudsman and Human Rights, 22 AD. L. REV. 467, 478-79 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Frank, AD. L. REv.]; Frank, The Nebraska Public Counsel-The Ombudsman, 5
CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV. 30, 31-32 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Frank, CUMBERLANDSAMFORD L. REV.].
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Governor which handles complaints-this office relies in great part on
the agency against whom the complaint is made.
5. The Ombudsman provides the citizen with an expert and
impartial agent who acts informally, without time delay, without cost
to the complainant, and without the requirement of counsel or an
adversary proceeding, to determine whether the complainant has been
wronged by government and, if so, to recommend corrective action.
He supplements and does not replace existing institutions.
6. The presence of the office of Ombudsman has value, in that its
existence serves as a deterrent to the bureaucracy.
Several proposals have been advocated in recent years to establish
an Ombudsman office, although these proposals have varied according
to their drafter's concept of the scope of the office.
The first Ombudsman bill, House Bill 3891, was introduced in
Connecticut in 1963, by Representative Nicholas Eddy who had been4
interested in the Ombudsman concept advocated by Ralph Nader.
The first model Ombudsman statute was issued by the Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau in 1965.- Professor Walter Gellhorn,
one of the nation's leading authorities on the Ombudsman, prepared
an "Annotated Model Ombudsman Statute" in 1967.6 In the same
year, the American Assembly held its program on "The Ombudsman." '7 Its final report urged the establishment of Ombudsmen
offices in American local and state governments, and although it did
not recommend the establishment of a single Ombudsman office for
the entire federal government, it did recommend application of the
concept at the federal level. Also in 1967 the American Bar Association, Section of Administrative Law, created the Ombudsman Committee. 8 In 1969, the American Bar Association adopted at its .midyear
4. This proposal never passed, however. See Anderson, Connecticut Ombudsman?, 70 CASE
& COM., 1, 4 (Mar.-Apr. 1965).
5. Comment, A State Statute to Create the Office of Ombudsman, 2 HARV. J. LEGIS. 213-38
(1965) [this model statute is hereinafter cited as Harvard Model Statute]. The Hawaii statute is
based on this model statute.
6. Professor Gellhorn's Annotated Model Statute [hereinafter cited as Gellhorn Model
Statute] is reprinted in OMBUDSMEN FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT? 159-73 (S.V. Anderson ed.
1968). Professor Gellhorn stated that his draft had been built upon foundations others had laid,
including the 1963 Connecticut bill and the Harvard Model Statute, which in turn had leaned
heavily on the 1962 New Zealand Act-Act of September 7, 1962, Parliamentary Commissioner
(Ombudsman) Act, [1962] New Zealand Statutes 106 (N.Z.)-which the Danish law had
influenced. The Iowa and Nebraska statutes follow in great part the Gellhorn Model Statute.
7.

THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, THE OMBUDSMAN: REPORT OF THE THIRTY-SECOND AMERI-

CAN ASSEMBLY (1967). The American Assembly is a periodic program sponsored by Columbia

University and attended by prominent persons in the legal and other professions. Each Assembly
concentrates on a particular topic of broad concern and societal signifieance. At the end of each
gathering, the Assembly publishes a report which represents the conclusions of the participants at the
assembly. The 1967 topic dealt with the Ombudsman.
8. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis served as first Chairman of the ABA Ombudsman Committee, Section of Administrative Law (1967-1968). Successive chairmen were J. Parker Connor
(1968-1969), Gerald L. Sbarboro (1969-1970), and Bernard Frank (1970-).
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meeting of its House of Delegates a resolution on the Ombudsman
which was amended in 1971. This resolution sets forth twelve essentials which should be contained in an Ombudsman statute: 9
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association
recommends:
1. That state and local governments of the United States
should give consideration to the establishment of an ombudsman authorized to inquire into administrative action and
to make public criticism.
2. That each statute or ordinance establishing an ombudsman should contain the following twelve essentials: (1)
authority of the ombudsman to criticize all agencies, officials,
and public employees except courts and their personnel, legislative bodies and their personnel, and the chief executive and
his personal staff; (2) independence of the ombudsman from
control by any other officer, except for his responsibility to
the legislative body; (3) appointment by the legislative body
or appointment by the executive with confirmation by a
designated proportion of the legislative body, preferably more
than a majority, such as two-thirds; (4) independence of the
ombudsman through a long term, not less than five years,
with freedom from removal except for cause, determined by
more than a majority of the legislative body, such as twothirds; (5) a high salary equivalent to that of a designated top
officer; (6) freedom of the ombudsman to employ his own
assistants and to delegate to them, without restraints of civil
service and classification acts; (7) freedom of the ombudsman
to investigate any act or failure to act by any agency, official,
or public employee; (8) access of the ombudsman to all public
records he finds relevant to an investigation; (9) authority to
inquire into fairness, correctness of findings, motivation,
adequacy of reasons, efficiency, and procedural propriety of
any action or inaction by any agency, official, or public
employee; (10) discretionary power to determine what complaints to investigate and to determine what criticisms to
make or to publicize; (11) opportunity for any agency, official, or public employee criticized by the ombudsman to have
advance notice of the criticism and to publish with the criticism an answering statement; (12) immunity of the ombudsman and his staff from civil liability on account of
official action.
3. That for the purpose of determining the workability
of the ombudsman idea within the Federal government, the
Federal government should experiment with the establishment of an ombudsman or ombudsmen for limited geographical area or areas, for a specific agency or agencies or
for a limited phase or limited phases of Federal activity.
9. The International Bar Association, in addition, adopted a resolution on the Ombudsman
at its 1974 Vancouver Conference.
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4. That establishment of a Federal government wide
ombudsman program should await findings based upon the
experimentation recommended.
Be It FurtherResolved, That the Section of Administrative Law is authorized to present the views of the Association
and to encourage the establishment of ombudsmen in accordance with the provisions of this Resolution, by all necessary
and appropriate means.
Other developments regarding the Ombudsman proposals eventually led to the American Bar Association's formulation of a model
Ombudsman statute. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Laws in or about 1968 created a special committee to prepare
a Uniform Ombudsman Act, but this committee was split in opinion
as to whether uniform legislation was desirable. The Ombudsman
Committee, Section of Administrative Law, American Bar Association, after polling its members, concluded that a uniform statute was
not needed but that a model Ombudsman statute should be prepared.
Professor Walter Gellhorn gave his permission to the Ombudsman
Committee to use his Annotated Model Ombudsman Statute as a base
for a new model Ombudsman statute. At the request of the Ombudsman Committee, Yale Law School Legislative Services undertook
to prepare a model Ombudsman statute for state government and was
instructed by the Ombudsman Committee to use Professor Gellhorn's
model statute as a base and conform the model to the American Bar
Association Resolution essentials. Edward G. Grossman, a student at
Yale University Law School, acted as project co-ordinator and prepared a first draft of a Model Ombudsman Statute for State Governments.
The ABA Model Ombudsman Statute for State Governments
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) was reviewed by a special Ombudsman
sub-committee consisting of Stanley V. Anderson, Milton M. Carrow,
Andrew N. Farley, Paul P. Flynn, Walter Gellhorn, Helen T. Ginder,
Clinton J. Hall, Benny L. Kass, Martin I. Klein, L. Harold Levinson,
Stephen Pierson, Benjamin N. Schoenfeld, Jerome S. Weiss, and
Bernard Frank. The comments received from the sub-committee were
reviewed by Bernard Frank, and the model draft number one was
revised accordingly. Draft number two was submitted to the special
sub-committee, and after comments had been received from its members and Edward G. Grossman, the final draft was prepared. In
March 1974 copies of the ABA Model Ombudsman Statute for State
Governments (1974) were sent to state legislative reference bureaus and
libraries and other interested persons.10 State Senator Julius C.
Michaelson introduced in Rhode Island in March 1974 the first bill
based on the ABA Model Ombudsman Statute for State Governments
(1974).
10. Included in the publication were the ABA Resolution and a bibliography on the Ombudsman prepared by Edward G. Grossman.
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The purpose of this article is to discuss the American Bar Association Ombudsman Committee Model Ombudsman Statute and to compare its provisions with the Hawaii, Iowa, and Nebraska statutes.
II.

THE

ABA

MODEL OMBUDSMAN STATUTE FOR
I
STATE GOVERNMENTS I

The ABA Model Statute contains 23 sections, annotated with
comments which the Ombudsman Committee endeavored to keep
brief.
In order to compare the state statutes to the ABA Model Statute,
each section of the ABA Model Statute and its comments shall be
printed separately, in full, as a guide to the understanding of the
contrasting viewpoints on the scope of the Ombudsman office.
A. Section 1. Legislative Purpose
IT IS THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE TO ESTABLISH, IN ADDITION TO OTHER REMEDIES OR
RIGHTS OF APPEAL OF ANY PERSON UNDER
IMPARTIAL,
STATE LAW, AN INDEPENDENT,
STATE OFFICE, READILY AVAILABLE TO THE
PUBLIC, RESPONSIBLE TO THE LEGISLATURE,
EMPOWERED TO INVESTIGATE THE ACTS OF
STATE [AND LOCAL] ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
AND TO RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE CHANGES
TOWARD THE GOALS OF SAFEGUARDING THE
RIGHTS OF PERSONS AND OF PROMOTING HIGHER
STANDARDS OF COMPETENCY, EFFICIENCY AND
JUSTICE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF STATE [AND
LOCAL] LAWS.
COMMENT: This suggested section provides a concise
description of the characteristics of the office and its
goals.
If jurisdiction over political subdivisions of the state is
included (see § 3(a) (4) comment), the phrase "and local"
should be included. Counsel must determine whether the
inclusion of the phrase "and local" will be interpreted as
pre-empting to the state jurisdiction over both state and
local agencies and prevent local governmental units from
establishing their own Ombudsmen.
Unlike the state statutes, the ABA Model Statute contains a
section on legislative purpose. As the comment indicates, it provides a
concise description of the characteristics of the Ombudsman office. It is
obvious that the enumeration does not contain all of the office's
characteristics-some of which are the receipt of complaints from
11. The ABA Model Ombudsman Statute for State Governments (1974) is hereinafter referred
to as the ABA Model Statute.

19751

STATE OMBUDSMAN LEGISLATION

aggrieved persons against government, inspection of agencies, production of testimony and documents, access to governmental records, and
issuance of reports. 12 There was no intention or necessity to enumerate
all the duties. In addition, section one sets forth the two goals of the
Ombudsman-to safeguard the rights of persons and to improve the
administration of laws.
B. Section 2. Short Title
THIS ACT MAY BE CITED AS "THE
[NAME OF STATE] OMBUDSMAN ACT OF
[YEAR]."
COMMENT. The title "Ombudsman" is both wellpublicized and distinctive in character. The American
state experience has varied: Hawaii, "Ombudsman";
Nebraska, "Public Counsel"; and Iowa, "Citizens' Aide."
But it should be noted that in Nebraska and Iowa the
term "Ombudsman" is used by the public, the media,
and even by the incumbents, who found that their original titles were easily confused with other very different
offices and concepts. If a term other than "Ombudsman"
is selected, appropriate changes must be made throughout this Act.
However, the term "Ombudsman" should be used only
when the legislation provides for an independent official
who receives complaints against government agencies
and who, after investigation, may, if the complaints are
justified, make recommendations to remedy the complaints.
The ABA Model Statute prefers the use of the term "Ombudsman." There would seem to be no purpose in using another name
merely because it is alleged that Ombudsman is a foreign sounding
word. Nebraska's Murrell B. McNeil has indicated clearly his preference: he has placed the term Ombudsman on the door, in the telephone directory, on letterheads, and in annual reports and brochures
and has stated, "The word is new to our vocabulary, however that fact
must be overcome. An advantage of the word is that once it is known
'13
to the public, the communication net is established.
The annotation to section two makes it clear that the word "Ombudsman" should be applied only to those officials who come within
the definition given in the comment; this definition is basically similar
to the one stated at the commencement of this article. It is unfortunate, this writer believes, that the term has been and is being increasingly used throughout the world, and particularly so in the United
12. Frank, AD. L. REV., supra note 3, at 477-78.
13. Frank, CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REv., supra note 3, at 35.
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States, to mean any complaint-handling mechanism whether governmental or non-governmental. As a result, three views have developed:
1. An office based on the definition of Ombudsman as stated
in this article and in the comment (and other somewhat similar definitions) is the only office entitled to call itself Ombudsman. This is the
position taken in the ABA Model Statute and is the view held by this

writer. 14
2. Ombudsman means any complaint-handling mechanism-in
government, in business, in consumerism, in education, anywhere,
any kind, any type. There are no limitations to the term and its
general application.
3. Ombudsman still means any complaint-handling mechanism,
but appropriate qualifying words should be added to describe the
type-thus classical Ombudsman, legislative Ombudsman, executive
Ombudsman, business Ombudsman, college Ombudsman, TV Ombudsman, newspaper Ombudsman, etc. 15 Then governmental Ombudsmen become classical or legislative if within the definition stated
in the opening of this article and in the comment to section two; or
they become executive Ombudsmen if appointed by, responsible to,
and serving at the pleasure of the executive. 16 This solution is certainly
preferable to the second view expressed immediately above, but encourages the adulteration as well as the proliferation because the
qualifying word is rarely if at all used by the official involved. The
distinction is adhered to only by the legal and political science commentators.
C.

Section 3.

Definitions

AS USED IN THIS ACT,
(a) "AGENCY" MEANS ANY DEPARTMENT, ORGANIZATION, BOARD, COMMISSION, COUNCIL,
INSTITUTION OR OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY OF
[NAME OF STATE], AND ANY OFFICIAL, OFFICER,
EMPLOYEE, OR MEMBER THEREOF ACTING OR
PURPORTING TO ACT BY REASON OF HIS CONNECTION WITH
[NAME OF STATE], EXCEPT:
(1) ANY COURT, OR JUDGE AND APPURTENANT JUDICIAL STAFF;
(2) THE LEGISLATURE, ITS MEMBERS, ITS
COMMITTEES, ITS STAFF AND ITS EMPLOYEES;
14. Id. at 30.
15. Rowat, The Spread of the Ombudsman Idea, in OMBUDSMEN FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT? 7, 35 (S. V. Anderson ed. 1968).
16. A. WYNER, EXECUTIVE OMBUDSMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 10-13, 307-14 (1973).
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(3) THE
GOVERNOR AND
HIS PERSONAL
STAFF;
[(4) (ALTERNATE A) ANY POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE;]
[(4) (ALTERNATE B) MAYORS, COUNCIL MEMBERS, AND JUDGES OF ANY POLITICAL SUBDIVISION AND THEIR PERSONAL STAFFS;]
(5) ANY MULTI-STATE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY.
(b) AN "ACT OF AN AGENCY" MEANS ANY ACTION,
DECISION, FAILURE TO ACT, OMISSION, RULE OR
REGULATION,
INTERPRETATION,
RECOMMENDATION, POLICY, PRACTICE OR PROCEDURE OF
ANY AGENCY.
(c) "PERSON" MEANS ANY INDIVIDUAL, AGGREGATE OF INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATION, PARTNERSHIP, OR UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION.
COMMENT.
(a) Rather than specifying by name those agencies
under the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, the Act permits
jurisdiction over all state-related governmental operations and personnel (in pursuance of public function)
with certain limited exceptions which should be
minimized.
(a)(1) An exclusion of the judicial branch rests on its
traditional independence and immunity from investigation; its internal review mechanisms (e.g., judicial conference); its continuous review by the profession (viz.,
Bar); and, in some states, its review by judicial commissions.
The wording ('appurtenant judicial staff') and
judicious experimentation and experience should permit
review of those peripheral to the adjudication itself.
(a)(2) The Legislature-an independent policymaking body; whose actions are conspicuous and subject
to public scrutiny; whose tenure is subject to periodic
popular review-is excluded. Committees and staff
members who assist in policy formation are, likewise,
excluded.
(a)(3) Elected state officials (e.g., Lt. Governor,
Treasurer) who deserve exclusion for the same reasons as
(a)(2) above, may be added to (a)(3) but they must be
distinguished from other elected state officials who
should be included and who are less immediately involved in policy-making and are engaged chiefly in
administrative matters indistinguishable from those performed by non-elected officials generally. Thus, appropriate officials to be excluded may vary from state to state.
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Alternatively, this exclusion might read, "(3) elected constitutional officials and their personal staff;".
(a)(4)
Alternate A. Where local jurisdiction is not included, (a)(4) should read, "(4) any political subdivision
of the state".
Alternate B. If jurisdiction over a political division
is included, -Alternate B should be used to give an exclusion parallel to that for state officials, "[(a)(4) mayors,
council members, and judges of political subdivisions
and their personal staff]."
(a)(5) The specific exclusion of multi-state entities,
such as regional transportation and planning authorities,
and implicit exclusion of federal agencies (including the
local offices thereof) as 'agencies' are limited to 'entities
of the state', are based on practical and constitutional
limitations on sovereign power of the state over such
agencies.
(b) "Acts of Agency" is broadly defined.
(c) "Person" is defined broadly.
The ABA Model Statute and the Hawaii, Nebraska, and Iowa
statutes have sections which define several of the key words used in
them. The words "agency" or "administrative agency" and "act of an
agency" or "administrative act" or "administrative action" are found in
all four to indicate the scope of the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
"Person" is defined only in the ABA Model and the Iowa statutes. The
descriptive "administrative" is omitted in section three of the ABA
Model Statute because it might be construed as limiting jurisdiction.
The scope and limitations of the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under
section 11(a), which relates to "any act of an agency," are found in the
section three definitions. This same approach is found in the three
17
state statutes.
"Agency" in section three includes an enumeration of two groups:
governmental entities and personnel. The state statutes are less detailed than section three, but there does not appear to be any significant omission in them. However, in referring to the individuals, the
ABA Model Statute and the Nebraska statute refer to those "acting or
purporting to act by reason of . . . connection with" the state, but
Hawaii and Iowa describe those "acting or purporting to act in the
exercise of . . . official duties." The former stems from the Gellhorn
Model Statute (whereas the latter is based on the Harvard Model
Statute) and represents a broader definition in not referring to "official
duties" which may be construed as words of limitation."8
17. HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 96-1, -5 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601G.1, 9(1) (Supp. 1974);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8, 240, 245(1) (Supp. 1969).
18. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-1(a) (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.1(2) (Supp. 1974); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-8,240(1) (Supp. 1969); Harvard Model Statute § 102(a); Gellhorn Model Statute

§ 2(a).
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Section three sets forth four exclusions and an alternative fifth
exclusion from the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman:
1. The exemption of the judicial branch, based on the court's
traditional independence, is contained in all the state statutes under
review. However, the language "any court, or judge and appurtenant
judicial staff' covered in both the ABA Model Statute and the Iowa
statute is broader than Nebraska's "any court" and, in this author's
opinion and that of Professor Gellhorn, eliminates any question as to
whether the exemption granted the judicial system extends to courts,
judges, employees, law clerks, and lawyers as officers of the court. 19
In 1974, Hawaii amended its statute to change the exception from "a
'20
court" to "the judiciary and its staff."
2. The legislature is also exempt in all state statutes. The ABA
Model Statute is more detailed but basically covers under the legislative exception the legislators and their committees and employees, as
do Hawaii and Iowa. 2 1 The Nebraska statute makes no reference to a
committee exemption but does include the Legislative Council. 22 It is

not believed that Nebraska's omission creates a significant difference.
3. All the statutes are in accord with the ABA Model Statute in
withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman complaints
against the Governor and his personal staff. The comment to section
3(a)(3) points out that other elected officials might be excluded, and an
appropriate alternative is suggested. The only statute to exclude a state
official other than the Governor is Hawaii which in 1974 amended its
statute to provide an exemption for the Lieutenant Governor and his
personal staff. 23 The question may well be asked, in view of the recent
events in Washington popularly known as Watergate and the conduct
of the then-President of the United States and his staff, whether the
exclusion provided for the executive and his staff in Ombudsman
legislation is proper. The function for an Ombudsman in government
would seem to apply with equal force to scrutiny of the acts of the
executive.
4. Local government exclusion from or inclusion in the Ombudsman's jurisdiction is left to the decision of the legislature. If
political subdivisions are to be excluded (as in Nebraska), appropriate
language is recommended in the ABA Model Statute. If local government is to come within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, then the
ABA Model Statute recommends that the phrase "and local" be included in the legislative purpose (section one) and further that consideration be given to exclude in the section three definition of "agency"
certain local officials. Both Iowa and Hawaii have jurisdiction over
19.
1969).
20.
21.
22.
23.

IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.1-2(a) (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,240(1) (Supp.
HAWAII REV. STAT.
HAWAII REv. STAT.
NEB. REV. STAT. §
HAWAII REV. STAT.

§ 96-1(a)(1) (Supp. 1974).
§ 96-1(a)(2) (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.1-2(b) (Supp. 1974).
81-8,240(1)(b) (Supp. 1969).
§ 96-1(a)(6) (Supp. 1974).
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local government, but only the Hawaii law makes provision (by a 1974
amendment) for an exclusion for mayors and councils of the various
counties. 24
It is appropriate to discuss at this point several problems in
connection with local government. It is obvious that omitting local
government from the jurisdiction of the state Ombudsman does not
prevent the creation of the office by a political subdivision of the state.
On the other hand, the comment to section one does raise the question
(originally posed by Professor L. Harold Levinson, a member of the
Ombudsman Committee) whether inclusion of local government will
be interpreted as preempting to the state jurisdiction over both state
and local agencies to prevent a local government from establishing its
own local Ombudsman. The ABA Model Statute does not address this
point, but this writer believes that the question must be answered in
the affirmative. The problem of immunities of the local Ombudsman
discussed hereafter under section 17 points to the desirability of state
legislation covering the subject of local government. Either a state
should give its Ombudsman jurisdiction over both local and state
agencies or a state should have several statutes, one permitting local
government to establish a local Ombudsman under the detailed provisions of a state statute and the other establishing a state Ombudsman
25
without local jurisdiction.
Another possible alternative suggested by Professor Levinson is to
have a statute provide for a state-wide Ombudsman without local
jurisdiction but to give enabling authority for any local government to
establish a local Ombudsman with essentially the same attributes and
26
powers, subject to some variations.
5. It is made clear in the ABA Model Statute and the three state
statutes that multi-state government entities are exempt from the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. 27 However, the language of the ABA
Model Statute and the Hawaii statute is preferable, because of its
simplicity, to the language of the Nebraska and Iowa statutes, the
latter stating, "any instrumentality formed pursuant to an interstate
compact and answerable to more than one state."
6. The ABA Model Statute like Iowa does not specify an exclusion for federal agencies because it was deemed superfluous in view of
constitutional limitations. However, the Hawaii and Nebraska statutes
28
do contain such an explicit exclusion.
24. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-1(a)(7)(8) (Supp. 1974).
25. For example, the Georgia legislature passed in 1974, H.B. 85 amending the Atlanta City
Charter providing for an Ombudsman. On opinion of the City Attorney to the effect that the state
law was improper, the City Council passed its own Ombudsman ordinance.
26. Letters from Professor L. Harold Levinson to Bernard Frank, Oct. 30, 1973, and Jan.
11, 1974.
27. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-1(4) (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.1-2(d) (Supp. 1974);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,240(1)(e) (Supp. 1969).

28. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-1(a)(3) (1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,240(1)(0 (Supp. 1969).
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The key word "act of an agency" is defined in section 3(b) very
broadly. The state statutes vary in their interpretations of agency
action. 29 Nebraska includes an agency "order," but omits within the
scope of an agency's action "failure to act, interpretation, or policy."
Hawaii omits "failure to act, rule or regulation, interpretation, or
policy," but adds that it does not include "the preparation or presentation of legislation." Iowa covers "policy, action, or failure to act," but
adds as to the latter, "pursuant to law."
"Person" is defined only in the ABA Model Statute and the Iowa
statute, and both use the same language.
D. Section 4. Creation of Office
THE OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN IS HEREBY ESTABLISHED.
The three state statutes use somewhat similar language with only
30
minor differences.
E.

Section 5. Nomination and Appointment
(ALTERNATE A)
THE (INSERT NAME OF LEGISLATIVE BODY)
SHALL ELECT THE OMBUDSMAN BY A TWOTHIRDS VOTE OF THE MEMBERS OF EACH HOUSE
PRESENT AND VOTING.
(ALTERNATE B)
THE GOVERNOR SHALL APPOINT THE OMBUDSMAN SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION BY A
TWO-THIRDS VOTE OF THE MEMBERS OF EACH
HOUSE OF THE (INSERT NAME OF LEGISLATIVE
BODY) PRESENT AND VOTING.
COMMENT. In foreign countries the Ombudsman has
been elected by the legislature. This appears to be the
method favored to date by the state legislatures which
have adopted Ombudsman legislation. Alternate A follows this pattern.
However, in view of the American tradition of appointment by the Chief Executive, Alternate B provides for
such appointment, subject to confirmation by the legislature.
The American Bar Association Resolution on the Ombudsman sets forth both alternatives.
The comment to section five is not accurate in stating that in
foreign countries the Ombudsman has been elected by the legislature.
29. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-1(b) (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.1-5 (Supp. 1974); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-8,240(2) (Supp. 1969).
30. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-2 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G. 2 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 81-8,241 (Supp. 1969).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

This is true only with respect to the Scandinavian countries. Appointments elsewhere vary from country to country. 3 ' For example, in New
Zealand the Ombudsman is appointed by the Governor-General on the
recommendation of the House of Representatives. In the United
States, the three states have made the selection of the Ombudsman
part of a legislative process and have assigned no role whatever to the
Governor, thus making it clear that the office is an arm of the legislature. 32 Hawaii requires selection by majority vote of each house in
joint session. Iowa provides for appointment by the Legislative Council with confirmation by a constitutional majority of each house. Nebraska's unicameral body selects the Public Counsel by a two-thirds
vote from nominations submitted by the Legislative Council Executive
Board.
The ABA Model Statute follows the ABA Resolution in setting
forth two alternatives for selection-election by the Legislature or
appointment by the Governor with confirmation by the Legislatureand in fixing a legislative vote of more than a majority. The ABA
Resolution, when passed in 1969, originally provided for only one
method-selection by the Governor with confirmation by the Legislature. This was changed in 1971 to the two present alternative methods
when the Ombudsman Committee learned that in 1970 the High
Commissioner of Micronesia had disapproved Ombudsman legislation
on two grounds, one of which was that the proposed statute, providing for appointment by the legislature only, did not conform to
33
the 1969 ABA Resolution.
F. Section 6. Qualifications
(a) THE OMBUDSMAN AND DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
SHALL BE PERSONS OF RECOGNIZED JUDGMENT,
OBJECTIVITY AND INTEGRITY WHO ARE WELLEQUIPPED TO ANALYZE PROBLEMS OF LAW, ADMINISTRATION, AND PUBLIC POLICY.
(b) NO PERSON WHILE SERVING AS OMBUDSMAN,
ACTING OMBUDSMAN, OR DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN:
(1) SHALL BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN POLITICAL PARTY ACTIVITIES;
(2) SHALL BE A CANDIDATE FOR OR HOLD
OTHER PUBLIC OFFICE, WHETHER ELECTIVE OR
APPOINTIVE;
(3) SHALL BE ENGAGED IN ANY OTHER OCCUPATION, BUSINESS, OR PROFESSION;
(4) SHALL REMAIN IN OFFICE AFTER THE
LAST DAY OF DECEMBER IN THE YEAR IN WHICH
HE REACHES THE AGE OF SEVENTY YEARS.
31.

K.

WEEKS, OMBUDSMEN AROUND

THE WORLD: A COMPARATIVE CHART (1973).

32. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-2 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.3 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 81-8,241 (Supp. 1969).
33. 96 ABA REPORTS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SECTION 749-51 (1971).
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COMMENT. The Ombudsman, Acting Ombudsman
and Deputy Ombudsman should be full-time impartial
experts in whom the public can have confidence.
(a) This sub-section expresses succinctly the desirable traits of an Ombudsman, more clearly expressing
the legislative intent than by merely listing restrictions on
the official. Experience points to the desirability of a legal
background, but this section does not prevent the appointment of qualified, individuals from other professions.
(b) (1-3) These provisions, while insuring that the
Ombudsman's work is performed on a full-time basis,
inhibit politicization of his office and conflicts of interest
in his outside professional contacts (whether or not for
profit).
While (b)(2) inhibits an Ombudsman's using the
office as an immediate political stepping-stone, some
states have prQposed to go further and to add a section
reading, "shall not have served as a member of the
Legislature for two years prior to his appointment and
shall not serve as a member of the Legislature for three
years following completion of the term for which he was
appointed," which would prevent use of the office as a
political plum as well. However, this would also unnecessarily prevent appointment of a highly qualified
legislator, governor or judge; the appointment process
should provide a sufficient screen against outright political favoritism.
(b)(4) This suggested section is parallel to the mandatory retirement requirement for judges in many states.
Section six, in dealing with the qualifications of the Ombudsman,
describes both affirmative and negative aspects-as do the Nebraska
and Iowa statutes. 34 The Hawaii statute limits itself to the prohibited
activities which would disqualify a person from serving. 35
The ABA Model Statute and the Nebraska and Iowa statutes
agree that the basic qualities of the Ombudsman (extended to the
Deputy Ombudsman only in the ABA Model Statute) are that the
person be equipped or qualified to handle problems of law, administration, and public policy; the ABA Model Statute additionally mentions
that the person possess "recognized judgment, objectivity and integrity." Such a catalogue delivers the message-only impartial experts
who are competent, objective, and fair should apply. In the Scandinavian countries, the Ombudsman is required to be either a lawyer or a
judge. The trend elsewhere does not make a legal background a
mandatory requirement, and other professionals as well as lawyers and
judges serve in the office. The ABA Model Statute and the three state
34. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601G.4, .7 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,242 (Supp.
1969).
35. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 96-2 (1968).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

statutes are in accord with the latter approach. Herman S. Doi of
Hawaii and Thomas R. Mayer of Iowa are lawyers. Murrell B.
McNeil of Nebraska is a retired military officer who served state
government in several capacities before his election as Public Counsel.
As for additional qualities demanded of the Ombudsman, only Iowa
has a state citizenship requirement.
The ABA Model Statute and the three state statutes restrict or
prohibit certain activities oy the Ombudsman. The ABA Model Statute in section 6(') specifically extends the restrictions to the Acting
Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman. The Iowa statute is the
most inclusive as to those persons in the Ombudsman's office who are
affected by the restrictions since it specifies that neither the Citizens'
Aide nor any member of his staff shall engage in the prohibited
activities. However, it would seem that even without the specific
inclusion of staff under the legislation being reviewed the prohibitions
would apply, if not by implication, then realistically by the controls of
the Ombudsman over his staff.
The ABA Model Statute covers four specific restrictions:
1. The prohibition against active involvement in political party
activities is preferable to the vague "partisan affairs" involvement
restriction found in the Nebraska and Iowa statutes. Hawaii's statute
is silent on this point.
2. The purpose of the prohibition against campaigning for or
holding other public office, whether elective or appointive, is to prevent use of the Ombudsman office as an instrument to seek other
public office-whether federal, state, or local and whether or not for
compensation. There is no better way to destroy the public's image of
the Ombudsman office than to violate this prohibition and the prior
one against political party activities. The independence of the office
must be maintained. Both Nebraska and Hawaii prohibit the Ombudsman from being a candidate for or from holding any other state
office. Iowa prohibits the Citizens' Aide or any member of his staff
from holding any other public office of trust or profit under the laws of
the State. The Iowa statute does not specifically forbid being a candidate, unless its language which prohibits active involvement in partisan affairs is so interpreted. The broader language of the ABA Model
Statute is preferable.
3. The ABA Model Statute and the three state statutes seek to
assure a full-time Ombudsman. Hawaii and Nebraska both prohibit
engaging in "any other occupation for reward or profit," whereas Iowa
prevents engaging "in any other employment for remuneration." The
ABA Model Statute, which is more sweeping, covers "any other occupation, business, or profession," but it is doubtful that this enumeration produces a different result from the state statutes except the ABA
Model Statute does not require that there be any reward, profit, or
remuneration from the employment. It is submitted that since a major

STATE OMBUDSMAN LEGISLATION

1975]

objective of Ombudsman legislation would be to require the Ombudsman to devote full time to his office, prevent conflict between the
position and other interests of the person serving as Ombudsman, and
preserve the impartial character of the office, the desired approach is
that of the ABA Model Statute which seeks to prevent the Ombudsman from being engaged in any occupation, business, or profession whether with or without remuneration. This language should
permit lectures or writings which do not interfere with the Ombudsman's duties.
4. Only the ABA Model Statute has a provision for mandatory
retirement of the Ombudsman upon his reaching a certain age. It is
obvious that this does not evaluate the capacity of the individual
serving as Ombudsman to continue after age seventy, but applies to
the Ombudsman office the desirable concept, found in many states, of
the compulsory retirement of judges. The provision for retirement
benefits in section 10 (c) should be noted.
Several of the states have other restrictions on the Ombudsman's
activities:
1. Hawaii and Nebraska prohibit serving as Ombudsman
within two years of the last day of service as a member of the
Legislature. It is difficult to understand why legislators are singled out
here since the appointment process should result in the selection of a
qualified Ombudsman and the elimination of undesirable candidates.
Both the ABA Model Statute and the Iowa statute reject this restriction.
2. Iowa has a conflict of interest restriction and prohibits the
Citizens' Aide and his staff from knowingly engaging in or maintaining
any business transactions with persons employed by agencies against
whom complaints may be made under the Iowa statute. This restriction
would seem to be covered in section 3(b)(3) of the ABA Model Statute
which prohibits the Ombudsman from being engaged in any business
transactions.
G.

Section 7.

Term of Office

THE OMBUDSMAN SHALL SERVE FOR A TERM OF
_

_

YEARS AND UNTIL HIS SUCCESSOR IS AP-

POINTED AND QUALIFIED. [(ALTERNATE A) HE
MAY BE REAPPOINTED FOR ADDITIONAL TERMS.]
[(ALTERNATE B) HE MAY NOT BE REAPPOINTED
FOR ADDITIONAL TERMS.]
COMMENT. A long term is desirable: to permit the
Ombudsman sufficient time to become proficient at his
duties; to provide a measure of independence from politics; and to provide prestige and security to attract qualified people to the position. An excessively long term
(e.g., 15 years) prevents the desired periodic accountabil-
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ity to the Legislature. The term should not be less than
five (5) years.
Either Alternate A or Alternate B should be used to
make it clear the Ombudsman should be limited to one
term only or may be reappointed for additional terms.
The ABA Model Statute allows the state to determine the number
of years in a term, but the comment to section seven does recommend
a long term which should be not lesss than five years. This term, of
course, is subject to any state limitations on the duration of the term
of a public office. Hawaii and Nebraska Ombudsman statutes provide
for a six year term as compared to Iowa's four years.3 6 Only Hawaii
specifically provides for reappointment with a limitation on serving
three terms. It is assumed that the silence in the Nebraska and Iowa
statutes on this subject does not prevent reappointment, but it is
submitted that the statute should spell out specifically whether reappointment is permitted or not to avoid any future problems. The ABA
Model Statute allows the enacting state to determine whether the
Ombudsman should be reappointed or not, but does not limit the
number of terms. This writer is of the opinion that if the Ombudsman
has functioned properly and successfully and the appointing authorities want him to continue, there should be no statutory restriction
against re-election or a limitation on the number of terms that he can
serve.
The ABA Model Statute provides for the Ombudsman's term of
service to continue until a successor is appointed and qualified.
Hawaii amended its statute in 1974 to provide similarly that the term
of service will continue until the appointment of a successor. Iowa (in
addition to being the only state to specify a date for the commencement of a term-July 1 of the year of his approval by the Legislature)
specifies that the Citizens' Aide continue in office until his successor is
appointed by the Legislative Council. There would appear to be a gap
between the termination of office (until a successor is appointed
by Legislative Council) and commencement of term by the successor
(July 1 of the year his appointment is approved by Legislature). Nebraska has no provision for service until a successor is appointed.
H. Section 8. Removal and Vacancy
(a) THE LEGISLATURE BY A VOTE OF TWO-THIRDS
OF THE MEMBERS OF EACH HOUSE PRESENT AND
VOTING MAY REMOVE THE OMBUDSMAN OR ACTING OMBUDSMAN FROM OFFICE, BUT ONLY FOR
MENTAL OR PHYSICAL INCAPACITY TO PERFORM
THE DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE FOR AT LEAST THREE
MONTHS, OR OTHER GROUNDS SUFFICIENT FOR
REMOVAL OF A JUDGE FROM STATE COURT.
36. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-2 (1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,243 (Supp. 1969).
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(b) IF THE POSITION OF OMBUDSMAN BECOMES
VACANT FOR ANY REASON, THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN SHALL SERVE AS ACTING OMBUDSMAN
UNTIL AN OMBUDSMAN HAS BEEN APPOINTED
FOR A FULL TERM.
COMMENT. (a) Removal is made difficult and for
cause to prevent the sudden attacks or political threats
against the office more likely to occur in this country
without an Ombudsmanic tradition. Alternatively, this
sub-section might provide that the Ombudsman, et al.,
could be removed from office according to state constitutional provisions for removal of judges or other public
officials.
(b) In filling vacancies, full-term appointment is
preferable to remainder-of-term appointment as it provides the desirable longer term of office.
The ABA Model Statute adopts the principle that the independence of the Ombudsman is maintained by freeing him from removal
from office except for cause determined by a two-thirds vote of the
Legislature. These removal procedures are followed even when the
Governor may have become a part of the appointment process as
under alternate B, section five. This protects the Ombudsman from
removal by the Governor in the event the Governor objects to the
Ombudsman's activities. The three state statutes under review concur
in the principle that only the Legislature may remove the Ombudsman. 3 7 Only the ABA Model Statute includes both the Ombudsman and Acting Ombudsman under these removal provisions.
The process of removal must be made difficult so that, as the
comment to the Gellhorn Model Statute states, "[t]he Ombudsman
should be secure but not absolutely untouchable. '38 Two safeguards
should be present: a wide consensus of legislative opinion favoring
removal and specific and limited causes for removal. Hawaii and
Nebraska both require two-thirds vote of the legislators (Hawaii-in
joint session; Nebraska, of course, has only one chamber). Iowa, on
the other hand, permits removal by a constitutional majority vote of the
two houses or for reasons provided by chapter 66, 1973 Code of
Iowa.3 9 It should be noted that although the Hawaii statute requires a
two-thirds removal vote, the state's statute provides for appointment
on a majority vote. The ABA Model Statute and the Nebraska and
Iowa statutes, on the other hand, provide for the same required vote
on removal as on appointment.
37. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-2 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.5 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 81-8,243 (Supp. 1969).
38. Gellhorn Model Statute, supra note 6, at 162-63.
39. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 66.1 et seq. (1973). For a discussion of the grounds for removal
noted in the statute see note 40, infra and accompanying text.
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The second safeguard relates to specific and limited causes for
removal. The ABA Model Statute covers incapacity for a definite
period of time or grounds which are sufficient for removal of a judge
from a state court. Nebraska's grounds are incapacity, neglect of duty,
or misconduct, standards which are basically the same as Hawaii's
except that the term "disability" is used in place of the word "incapacity." The Iowa statute does not require the legislature to have any
cause for removal, but does specify by reference to chapter 66 an
alternative method of removal which requires removal by court for
specific reasons: willful or habitual neglect or refusal to perform the
duties of his office, willful misconduct or maladministration in office,
corruption, extortion, conviction of a felony, intoxication, or upon
conviction of being intoxicated. 40 The ABA Model Statute gives more
flexibility by relating the grounds for removal to those sufficient for
removal of a judge from a state court. Applying this standard to
Pennsylvania, for example, would mean removal for "misconduct in
office, neglect of duty, failure to perform his duties, or conduct which
prejudices the proper administration of justice or brings the judicial
office into disrepute."41

The ABA Model Statute and the three state statutes provide for
an acting Ombudsman in the event the Ombudsman position becomes
vacant: Iowa, the Deputy Citizens' Aide; Nebraska, the Deputy Public
Counsel; Hawaii, the First Assistant to the Ombudsman; and the ABA
Model Statute, the Deputy Ombudsman. The reasons, however, differ
with respect to the cause of the vacancy: ABA Model Statute, "for any
reason"; Nebraska, "for any cause"; Iowa, "absence from the state or
disability"; and Hawaii, "death, resignation, ineligibility to serve, removal, or suspension from office."
The ABA Model Statute avoids remainder-of-term appointments
since the Acting Ombudsman serves until the Ombudsman is appointed for a full term, as is true also in Hawaii and Nebraska and
possibly in Iowa. In Iowa, the Deputy serves as Citizens' Aide until
the vacancy is filled by the Legislative Council, but it should be noted
that appointment by the Legislative Council requires approval by the
Legislature and that service of such appointee begins from July 1 of
the year of approval for a four-year term.
I.

Section 9.

Compensation

THE OMBUDSMAN SHALL RECEIVE THE SAME
SALARY AND BENEFITS AS THE CHIEF JUDGE OF
THE
[HIGHEST COURT OF STATE].
40. IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.5 (Supp. 1974); IOwA CODE ANN. § 66.1 (1973).
41. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d).
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COMMENT. This high salary reflects the responsibility
and prestige of the office and should be sufficient remuneration to attract qualified people. Rather than fixing the
salary at a specific sum, which would shortly become
obsolete (leading inevitably to legislative wrangling), it is
pegged to a judge's salary and benefits (see § 10 (c)). Of
course, normal reimbursement of expenses is not included in compensation. If a specific dollar sum is desired, an additional provision is appropriate: "Compensation shall not be diminished during his tenure in office,
unless by general law applying to all salaried officers of
the State." Permitting a legislative committee or council
to set salary and benefits--which might fluctuate with
political moods-is neither fair to applicants for the post,
nor promotive of independence of the office, and may
effectively abrogate stiff removal provisions (§ 8 (a)).
The ABA Resolution essential of a high salary equivalent to that
of a designated top official is reflected in section nine of the ABA
Model Statute which relates the Ombudsman's salary and benefits to
that of the chief judge of the highest court in the state. Fixing the
compensation to that paid the chief state judge did not appeal to the
three state legislatures that enacted Ombudsman legislation in the
United States. 4 2 Hawaii relates the salary to that of a state circuit
judge and is the only state to specifically provide that compensation
shall not be diminished during the term of office unless by general law
applying to state salaried officers. In Nebraska, the Executive Board
of the Legislative Council fixes the salary of the Public Counsel. The
Iowa statute lacks a specific provision, but the Citizens' Aide's salary is
fixed by the Legislative Council. The control by the Legislative Councils of Nebraska and Iowa in determining the compensation of the
Ombudsman is inconsistent with the independence of the office and, as
the comment to section nine indicates, may lead to an easier method of
causing the removal of the Ombudsman in these states (by diminishing
the salary of the office) without compliance with strict statutory provisions and safeguards regarding removal.
J.

Section 10.

Organization of Office

(a) THE OMBUDSMAN SHALL SELECT, APPOINT
AND FIX THE COMPENSATION (WITHIN THE
AMOUNT AVAILABLE BY APPROPRIATION) OF A
PERSON AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND MAY
SELECT, APPOINT AND FIX THE COMPENSATION
(WITHIN THE AMOUNT AVAILABLE BY APPRO42. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-2 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.3 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 81-8,243 (Supp. 1969).
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PRIATION) OF SUCH OTHER OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES AS HE MAY DEEM NECESSARY TO
DISCHARGE HIS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THIS
ACT. ALL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF HIS OFFICE SHALL SERVE AT THE OMBUDSMAN'S PLEASURE.
(b) THE OMBUDSMAN MAY DELEGATE TO MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF ANY OF HIS AUTHORITY,
POWERS, OR DUTIES EXCEPT THIS POWER OF DELEGATION AND HIS DUTY TO MAKE ANY REPORT
UNDER THIS ACT. HOWEVER, THE OMBUDSMAN
MAY AUTHORIZE THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN TO
ACT IN HIS STEAD DURING ILLNESS, ABSENCE,
LEAVE, OR DISABILITY.
(c) THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS STAFF SHALL BE
ENTITLED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT OR RETIREMENT PLAN AVAILABLE TO
STATE EMPLOYEES.
COMMENT. (a) The experimental nature of the office
and the close, personal relationship engendered in such a
small staff implies the Ombudsman should be free of
civil service and political constraints in staff selection
and retention. The Ombudsman, however, should refer
to civil service salary schedules in setting comparable
salaries for staff, and would naturally use state accounting facilities for payment of such (cf., § 11(j)). The
appointment of a Deputy Ombudsman is compulsory,
while selection of other officials, including an Assistant
Ombudsman or Ombudsmen, is optional.
(b) This same desire for flexibility should permit a
broad delegation of powers. The Ombudsman, however,
remains responsible for the organization of his office and
for whatever reports leave the office (§ 16)-unless the
Deputy Ombudsman has assumed his duties in his absence or when the office is vacant (§ 8(b)). Rather than
requiring within the text of the bill that such delegation
be in writing, or that staff members take an oath of
office, such matters should be left to the Ombudsman's
discretion to impose, if found desirable, by regulation
(§ 11 (b)).
The ABA Model Statute proceeds on the principle that to be
independent the Ombudsman must control the selection and retention
of his staff.
The ABA Model Statute as well as the state statutes make the
appointment of a Deputy by the Ombudsman compulsory. 43 Only the
43. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-3 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.6 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 81-8,244 (Supp. 1969).
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ABA Model Statute in section six requires the Deputy Ombudsman to
have the same qualifications as the Ombudsman. The ABA Model
Statute and the Nebraska law permit the Ombudsman to fix the
compensation of his Deputy within the amount available by appropriation. In Hawaii, the Ombudsman must consult with and follow as
closely as possible the recommendations of the Department of Personnel Services, and the salary shall not exceed the percentage limitations
established by law for a deputy director of a department; in Iowa, the
Citizens' Aide designates a member of his staff as the Deputy, and the
salary is authorized by the Legislative Council. Only in the ABA
Model Statute and the Hawaii statute is there specific provision for
removal of the Deputy by the Ombudsman, but in Nebraska the
power is implied from the power explicitly granted the Ombudsman,
without any restrictions, to select and appoint his assistants. On the
other hand, in Iowa the Citizens' Aide's power to employ and supervise all employees is limited by the authority of the Legislative Council
to determine the positions and the salaries. Therefore, this language
seems to limit the Citizens' Aide's right to employ, and it is not clear
whether removal requires authorization from the Legislative Council.
The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine the size of his staff
and determine salaries within the amount of the funds available to his
office under the ABA Model Statute and the Nebraska statute.
Likewise, in Hawaii he may appoint his officers and employees, but he
is restricted in fixing salaries in that he must consult with and follow as
closely as possible the recommendations of the Department of Personnel Services. Even greater limitations are in the Iowa statute since the
Citizens' Aide may employ persons only in such positions, with the
exception of the Deputy, and at such salaries as shall be authorized by
the Legislative Council. It is made clear in the ABA Model Statute and
the Hawaii statute that staff serve at the Ombudsman's pleasure. This
point is not covered at all in the Iowa law, but is implicit in Nebraska
where the Ombudsman has the right to select and appoint his assistants and employees.
The broad power of delegation of authority to staff is recognized
in all the statutes under review. Certain exceptions exist, however,
which prohibit delegating authority to underlings. One exception, prohibiting delegating the power of delegation itself, is found in the ABA
Model Statute and the Nebraska statute. A second exception in the
ABA Model Statute from the power to delegate is the duty to make
any report. The Iowa and Nebraska statutes exclude from the delegation power the duty to make formal recommendations to agencies and
reports to the Governor and the Legislature. The Hawaii statute
excludes from the Ombudsman's power to delegate the reporting of
opinions and recommendations to agencies after he has completed his
investigation and the publication of his opinions and recommendations
to the Governor, the Legislature, or the public.
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The restrictions on the Ombudsman's power to delegate would
obviously cripple operations of an Ombudsman office if the Ombudsman were ill, absent, on leave, or disabled. The ABA Model
Statute covers this contingency by permitting the Deputy Ombudsman
to act in his stead at such times; this substitution can be made as the
occasion arises or as standing regulations permit. A 1974 amendment
to the Hawaii law plugs up this gap by providing that during the
absence of the Ombudsman from the Island of Oahu or his temporary
inability to exercise and discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the power to report his opinions and recommendations to agencies and
publish his opinions and recommendations to the Governor, Legislature, and the public devolves upon the First Assistant during such
absence or inability. 44 The Iowa statute provides for a substitution
upon the contingencies of the Ombudsman's absence from its state or
his disability, and the Nebraska Act is silent on the subject.
The ABA Model Statute and the Hawaii law both share the view
that the enacting law should spell out specifically the right of the
Ombudsman and his staff to participate in any employee benefit plan.
The Hawaii statute limits the right of staff benefits to full-time
staff, and the ABA Model Statute, by adding the language "or retirement plan available to state employees," may extend staff benefit
rights to include retirement benefits.
K. Section 11. Powers
THE OMBUDSMAN SHALL HAVE THE FOLLOWING
POWERS:
(a) TO INVESTIGATE, ON COMPLAINT OR ON HIS
OWN MOTION, ANY ACT OF AN AGENCY WITHOUT REGARD TO ITS FINALITY;
(b) TO ADOPT, PROMULGATE, AMEND AND RESCIND RULES AND REGULATIONS REQUIRED FOR
THE DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTIES-INCLUDING
PROCEDURES FOR RECEIVING AND PROCESSING
COMPLAINTS,
CONDUCTING
INVESTIGATIONS,
AND REPORTING HIS FINDINGS-NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS ACT. HOWEVER, HE MAY NOT
LEVY ANY FEES FOR THE SUBMISSION OR INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS;
(c) TO EXAMINE THE RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS
OF ANY AGENCY;
(d) TO ENTER AND INSPECT WITHOUT NOTICE
THE PREMISES OF ANY AGENCY;
(e) TO SUBPOENA ANY PERSON TO APPEAR, TO
GIVE SWORN TESTIMONY OR TO PRODUCE
DOCUMENTARY OR OTHER EVIDENCE THAT IS
REASONABLY MATERIAL TO HIS INQUIRY;
44. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-3 (Supp. 1974).
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(f) TO UNDERTAKE, PARTICIPATE IN OR COOPERATE WITH PERSONS AND AGENCIES IN SUCH
CONFERENCES,
INQUIRIES,
MEETINGS,
OR
STUDIES AS MIGHT LEAD TO IMPROVEMENTS IN
THE FUNCTIONING OF AGENCIES;
(g) TO OBTAIN SUCH INFORMATION AND MAKE
SUCH INQUIRIES FROM ANY AGENCY OR PERSON
AS HE SHALL REQUIRE FOR THE DISCHARGE OF
HIS DUTIES;
(h) TO MAINTAIN SECRECY IN RESPECT TO ALL
MATTERS AND THE IDENTITIES OF THE COMPLAINANTS OR WITNESSES COMING BEFORE HIM;
(i) TO BRING SUIT IN
[NAME OF COURT]
TO ENFORCE THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT;
(j) TO ESTABLISH AND ADMINISTER A BUDGET
FOR HIS OFFICE;
(k) TO CONCERN HIMSELF WITH STRENGTHENING PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES WHICH
LESSEN THE RISK THAT OBJECTIONABLE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS WILL OCCUR.
COMMENT. Powers are enumerated for clarity; additional powers of staff selection and compensation and
delegation of these powers are contained in § 10.
(a) His investigatory power is limited to acts of an
agency (§ 3(b)). As he can act on complaint regardless of
source, he can receive anonymous or oral complaints,
though his regulatory powers (subsection (b)) permit him
to require complaints in writing if experience dictates.
His power to investigate on his own motion is most
applicable when others are unwilling to come forward
(see (c) below).
(b) This broad, internal regulatory provision is relevant to many provisions in this bill. To insure accessibility (and avoid discrimination against the poor), charging of fees for his service is forbidden.
(c-d) The Ombudsman has the power to inspect any
agency without notice, as advance notice might negate
the value of such a visit. Such visits might provide
subjects for investigation on his own motion.
(e) Protections and privileges for witnesses, regardless of whether or not they have been subpoenaed, are
provided in § 18. §§ 11(i) and 19 provide means of
compelling compliance. Implicitly, he and his staff are
empowered to administer oaths to such witnesses.
(f) Though most of his time will be preoccupied
with individual complaints, he can embark on such
studies of a general nature as may improve the efficiency of agency work-alone or with other governmental bodies or non-governmental research enterprises.
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(g) There is no requirement of formal hearings of an
adversary nature. If a proceeding for the taking of testimony were in fact to occur, it should be perceived as
an element of an investigation rather than a proceeding
in the nature of a trial. Hence its content need not be the
same as would normally be demanded in a formal adjudication hearing.
(h) This suggested subsection expresses the desirability of maintaining confidentiality in the Ombudsman's
investigations.
(i) The office of Ombudsman may bring suits: for a
declaratory judgment to obtain jurisdiction (under §§
3(a) and 11(a)); to enter and inspect agencies (§ 11(d)); to
show cause for not appearing after subpoenaed (§ 11(e));
to enforce confidentiality provisions (§§ 13(d, e)); and to
prosecute for willful obstruction or non-compliance
(§ 19).
(j) A provision for budgetary powers may be necessary in some states, useful in others, to insure that the
Ombudsman's budget is independent of outside (agency)
administration.
(k) The Ombudsman should seek to prevent problems before they occur.
The ABA Model Statute grants broad powers to the Ombudsman,
and although there are some specific differences, the same principle is
45
also found in the state statutes under review.
Section 11(a) in giving the Ombudsman the power to investigate
"any act of an agency," combined with section three, which defines
these words, sets forth his jurisdiction. He may investigate not only on
complaint made to him but also on his own initiative. The same basic
language is found in the Iowa, Nebraska, and Hawaii statutes. It is
the arming of the Ombudsman with investigatory power with respect
to agency action complained of that makes him the unique official that
he is. 4 6 One limitation to this broad investigative power, which is
found only in the Iowa statute, prohibits investigating the complaint of
an employee of an agency in regard to that employee's employment
relationship with the agency. But generally, the power is extensive and
may be exercised upon informally-aired grievances in that there is no
requirement in the ABA Model Statute or the three state statutes that
the complaints be written; nor is there a prohibition against anonymous complaints. Under his power to determine procedures for receiving
and processing complaints contained in the ABA Model Statute and
the state legislation, however, the Ombudsman can require that com45. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 96-4, -5, -9, -10 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601G.8, .9, .10
(Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,245, 246 (Supp. 1969).
46. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-5 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.9(1) (Supp. 1974); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-8,245(1) (Supp. 1969).
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plaints be in writing. For example, in Nebraska Murrell B. McNeil
has concluded that a complaint must be in writing if very complex or
involving charges against a state employee and that anonymous complaints against an individual will not be accepted. 4 7 The Ombudsman's power to investigate is not conditioned on the finality of
agency action under the ABA Model Statute and the Hawaii and Iowa
statutes.
It is desirable that the Ombudsman statutes give broad discretion
to the Ombudsman to determine his procedures in carrying out the
functions of the office. There would seem to be no purpose in a statute
detailing requirements for complaints, investigations, findings, and
reports; detailed and specific requirements probably would be restrictive. There is a major difference between the ABA Model Statute and
the three state statutes in that the state statutes give authority specifically to establish procedures with respect to the handling of complaints, the conducting of investigations, and the reporting of findings.
The ABA Model Statute has a different approach in section 11(b) in
that it gives the Ombudsman the required broad discretion to determine his procedures in carrying out the functions of his office. It
provides for the Ombudsman to issue rules and regulations which are
not inconsistent with the statute and indicates that these include the
procedures for receiving and processing complaints, conducting investigations, and reporting his findings. This gives the Ombudsman the
opportunity to fill out a blank check with respect to his rules and
regulations required for the discharge of his duties. He is limited only
by the requirement that the rules and regulations not be inconsistent
with the statute.
Furthermore, it is inherent in the Ombudsman concept that no
fees be charged by the Ombudsman in order to assure accessibility to
the office. New Zealand alone, of all Ombudsman offices, provides for
a charge which in practice frequently has been waived, though legislation is now pending which will eliminate the fee. Since the power to
charge fees may be implied particularly where the statute provides that
the Ombudsman may make his own rules and regulations, as in the
case of the ABA Model Statute, it would seem best to include, as does
the ABA Model Statute, a specific provision prohibiting fees for the
submission or investigation of complaints. The Hawaii and Iowa statutes prohibit the levying of fees, but the Nebraska statute is silent.
However, the Ombudsman does not require the payment of charges
and fees by complainants in Nebraska.
Fundamental to the concept of the Ombudsman is the power to
investigate the acts of an agency, and to do this in an effective manner
the Ombudsman must have tools to deal with an agency. These are
specifically given to the Ombudsman under sections 11(c), (d), and (g)
47. Frank, CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV., supra note 3, at 40.
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of the ABA Model Statute: "to examine the records and documents of
any agency; to enter and inspect without notice the premises of any
agency; . . . [and] to obtain such information and make such inquiries

from any agency or person as he shall require for the discharge of his
duties." Both Nebraska and Iowa give these powers to the Ombudsman. However it should be noted that the Iowa statute limits the
right to examine the records and documents of agencies by excluding
those documents which the law specifically makes confidential; and in
both the Iowa and Nebraska statutes the requirement of inspection of
the premises of an agency omits spelling out the power to do so
without notice. The Hawaii statute does not follow the pattern of the
ABA Model Statute and the Nebraska and Iowa statutes in specifically
relating the three powers under consideration to an agency. The
Hawaii statute states generally that in an investigation the Ombudsman may make inquiries and obtain information as he sees fit.
However, the Hawaii statute does specifically provide for entry to
inspect agency premises without notice. In addition, the statute does
not provide the Ombudsman with a specific power to examine the
records and documents of an agency, but this power is implicit in the
provision which permits the Ombudsman in an investigation to make
inquiries and obtain information as he thinks fit. Although the ABA
Model Statute does not expressly limit the examination of records and
documents, as Iowa does, to those not specifically made confidential by
law, Ombudsmen could not undertake, in any of their endeavors,
activities forbidden by other state statutes. Within this exclusion from
examination would be records and documents of any agency which are
classified as confidential for security purposes.
Investigation by an Ombudsman would be useless without the
power to compel the giving of testimony and the production of
evidence. The ABA Model Statute in section 11(e) and the three state
statutes under review give the Ombudsman the power to subpoena
any person to appear, to give sworn testimony, or to produce
documentary evidence. The ABA Model Statute and the Nebraska and
Iowa statutes increase the scope of this production of evidence power
to include either documents "or other evidence," and the Hawaii
statute adds "or objects." There must, however, be a relationship
between the evidence sought and the matter under investigation. This
relationship is expressed in different ways in the various statutes: ABA
Model Statute-"reasonably material to inquiry"; Hawaii"reasonably believes may relate to a matter under investigation"; and
Nebraska and Iowa-"deems relevant to a matter under inquiry."
Under the ABA Model Statute, the power of enforcement is found in
the general provisions of section 11(i) which permits the Ombudsman
to institute suits to enforce the provisions of the Act. However, the
Hawaii, Nebraska, and Iowa statutes have specific provisions with
respect to the enforceability of a subpoena by action in an appropriate
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court. It is implicit in the ABA Model Statute that the Ombudsman
and his staff be empowered to administer oaths to witnesses. The only
statute with express language on the power to administer oaths is the
Iowa statute giving the power to the Citizens' Aide, his deputy, and
his assistants.
The power granted the Ombudsman in the ABA Model Statute in
section 11(f) indicates that the statute contemplates an Ombudsman
who will participate with governmental and non-governmental persons
and agencies in conferences, inquiries, meetings, and studies leading to
improvements in the functioning of agencies. Only the Nebraska statute gives the Ombudsman a somewhat similar power.
The ABA Model Statute gives the Ombudsman further sweeping
investigatory power under section 11(g) which permits him to obtain
such information and make such inquiries from any agency or person
as he shall require for the discharge of his duties. Hawaii follows the
same principle by stating that in an investigation the Ombudsman may
make inquiries and obtain information as he thinks fit. Nebraska and
Iowa do not have similar specific language except insofar as the power
of the Ombudsman relates to the agency under investigation. It is
assumed that the power to obtain information from any person in Iowa
and Nebraska is implied from other sections of the pertinent statutes,
but it would seem better to spell out the powers specifically, as is done
in the ABA Model Statute.
The ABA Model Statute, in granting the Ombudsman the power
to obtain information and make inquiries under section 11 (g) and the
power under section 11(b) to make rules and regulations, gives him the
power to develop his own procedures for conducting investigations.
The statute is careful to omit any reference to holding a hearing as part
of an investigation because the use of the term "hearing" may carry
with it the inference that administrative agency hearings were intended, which would require compliance with administrative procedure standards. It is submitted that the Hawaii and Iowa statutes do
not solve this problem by referring to the Ombudsman's discretion to
hold private hearings in an investigation. Reference to private hearings
may be a troublesome phrase because of the uncertainty of its meaning
as applied to the functions of the Ombudsman. The language of the
ABA Model Statute leaves the Ombudsman free to develop a procedure that matches the uniqueness of the functions of the office of
Ombudsman. The comment to section 11(g) of the ABA Model Statute
aptly states,
There is no requirement of formal hearings of an adversary
nature. If a proceeding for the taking of testimony were in
fact to occur, it should be perceived as an element of an
investigation rather than a proceeding in the nature of a trial.
Hence, its content need not be the same as would normally
be demanded in a formal adjudication hearing.
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It is important to the functioning of the Ombudsman office that
information disclosed to him in confidence not be divulged. This
pattern runs throughout the ABA Model Statute and the statutes under
review. The ABA Model Statute section 11(h) gives the Ombudsman
the power to maintain secrecy regarding all matters including the
identities of complainants and witnesses. Somewhat similar language
is used in the Iowa statute except that the General Assembly, any
standing committee of the General Assembly or the Governor may
require disclosure of any matter through complete access to the records
and files of the Citizens' Aide. Hawaii also uses the same language as
does the ABA Model Statute, but adds an exclusion for disclosures
necessary to enable the Ombudsman to carry out his duties and to
support his recommendations. Language similar to the ABA Model
Statute on confidentiality is not found in the Nebraska statute, but it
does state under a section dealing with reports4 8 that in discussing
matters with which he has dealt, the Public Counsel need not identify
those immediately concerned if to do so would cause needless hardship. Of course, the confidentiality provision would be meaningless if
the Ombudsman could be compelled to testify in court. This subject is
discussed subsequently in connection with Ombudsman Immunities,
section 17.
Only the ABA Model Statute specifically sets forth the power of
the Ombudsman to bring suit to enforce the provisions of the Ombudsman Act. As was noted prior, all of the state statutes under review
have provisions for court action with respect to the enforcement of
subpoenas.
The ABA Model Statute alone gives the Ombudsman the power
to establish and administer a budget for his office. This insures that an
outside agency is not given a power of control over operations of the
office which would be inconsistent with the principle of the Ombudsman as an independent officer. As a result, the Ombudsman could
keep his own financial books and disburse his own funds. It should be
noted, however, that in Nebraska the Ombudsman is included for
administrative purposes, such as bookkeeping and supplies, within the
framework of the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council.
The ABA Model Statute under section 1 l(k) gives to the Ombudsman the power to strengthen procedures and practices which
lessen the risk that objectionable administrative acts will occur. Similar provisions are found in the Iowa statute and the Nebraska statute
49
under sections dealing with subjects for investigation.
L. Section 12. Investigation of Complaints
(a) THE OMBUDSMAN SHALL INVESTIGATE ANY
COMPLAINT ALLEGING THAT AN ACT OF AN
AGENCY IS:
48. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,251 (Supp. 1969).
49. IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.11 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,246 (Supp. 1969).
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(1) CONTRARY TO OR INCONSISTENT WITH
LAW, REGULATION OR AGENCY PRACTICE; OR
(2) BASED ON MISTAKEN FACTS OR IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS; OR
(3) INADEQUATELY EXPLAINED WHEN REASONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVEALED; OR
(4) INEFFICIENTLY PERFORMED; OR
(5) UNREASONABLE, UNFAIR, OR OTHERWISE
OBJECTIONABLE, EVEN THOUGH IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW;
(b) UNLESS HE IN HIS DISCRETION DECIDES NOT
TO INVESTIGATE BECAUSE:
(1) THE COMPLAINANT COULD REASONABLY
BE EXPECTED TO USE ANOTHER REMEDY OR
CHANNEL, AND THEN THE OMBUDSMAN SHALL
FURNISH THE COMPLAINANT WITH WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE
TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH OTHER
REMEDY OR CHANNEL;
(2) THE COMPLAINT IS TRIVIAL, FRIVOLOUS,
VEXATIOUS, OR NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH;
(3) THE COMPLAINT HAS BEEN TOO LONG DELAYED TO JUSTIFY PRESENT EXAMINATION;
(4) HIS RESOURCES ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR
ADEQUATE INVESTIGATION IN WHICH CASE THE
OMBUDSMAN SHALL REFER THE COMPLAINT TO
THE PROPER LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE AND THE
GOVERNOR.
(c) THE OMBUDSMAN IN HIS DISCRETION MAY INVESTIGATE ANY ACT OF AN AGENCY NOT ENUMERATED IN (a).
(d) THE OMBUDSMAN'S DECLINING TO INVESTIGATE A COMPLAINT SHALL NOT BAR HIM FROM
REVIEWING ON HIS OWN MOTION ACTS OF AN
AGENCY WHETHER OR NOT INCLUDED IN THE
COMPLAINT.
COMMENT. (a), (b) and (c). The Ombudsman has the
duty to investigate any complaint which alleges the acts
of an agency enumerated in (a) but has the discretion to
decline to investigate for reasons stated in (b). He is not
limited to the type of problems enumerated in (a) and
has the discretion under (c) to investigate any act of an
agency not enumerated in (a).
(b) Paragraph (b)(1) reiterates that the Ombudsman
is not a substitute for agency's internal complaint procedures, nor can he be expected to absorb all the complaints that agencies generate. Citizens would normally
exhaust such avenues before approaching the Ombudsman; however, the Ombudsman can waive this exclusion whenever he believes that he may provide a faster
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and more just method of review. Paragraph (b)(3) provides a flexible statute of limitation which the Ombudsman may determine by regulation (§ 11(b)). Paragraph (b)(4) rechannels those complaints too ambitious or
time-consuming (e.g., complex local complaints) for effective investigation.
(d) A series of complaints, though themselves inappropriate for investigation, may reveal acts which should
be investigated on the Ombudsman's own motion.
Section 12 makes it clear that:
1. The acts which may give rise to complaints, described in (a)(1)
to (5) inclusive, are set forth as guides and not as limitations; this
question is resolved by the statement in (c) that the Ombudsman has
discretion to investigate any act of an agency not included in (a).
2. The Ombudsman has a duty to investigate under the wording
of (a), but he is relieved of this duty if the matter complained of falls
into one of the four enumerated reasons under (b), and then he has the
discretion whether or not to investigate.
Both Iowa and Nebraska have a different structural approach,
but the result is not different from the above analysis of section 12,50
In one section, these two statutes also enumerate types of acts which
cause grievances and use language which indicates that the Ombudsman is not limited to investigating those specifically set forth. The
Nebraska statute states that "[i]n selecting matters for his attention,
the Public Counsel shall address himself particularly to an administrative act that might be . . . ." The Iowa statute states "[a]n appropriate
subject for investigation by the office of the Citizens' Aide is an
administrative action that might be . . . ." In another section, Nebraska and Iowa statutes provide that he shall investigate unless he
finds that for the enumerated reasons he need not investigate. Both
statutes imply that in this situation, he has the discretion to investigate
or not.
Hawaii offers a third approach with perhaps different results. 5 1 In
a separate section, Hawaii also sets forth acts which are appropriate
subjects for investigation, but in another section makes it clear that
when investigating complaints or investigating on his own motion, the
Ombudsman is limited to the enumerated appropriate subjects. Even
though the Hawaii statute indicates as appropriate subjects for investigation administrative acts of an agency "which might be" (emphasis
added) any of the enumerated subjects of investigation, this commentator's conclusion has not changed that the Hawaii statute ends up
with limitations and not guides. Furthermore, in 1974 the Hawaii
statute was amended to provide that the Ombudsman "may" (instead
50. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601G.11, .12 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,246, 247
(Supp. 1969).
51. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 96-6, -8 (1968).
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of "shall") investigate complaints which he determines to be an appropriate subject for investigation. 52 Under this new Act he does not have
a mandatory duty to investigate even if the matter is an appropriate
subject for investigation. This writer believes that the Ombudsman
should investigate every complaint if the action complained of comes
within a described action, but he may be relieved of this duty by basing
his refusal to investigate on the specific grounds provided him by statute.
The ABA Model Statute follows this principle.
Both the Iowa and Nebraska statutes require a suitable investigation. The question may be asked whether the word "suitable" sets a
standard of investigation. However, it should be noted that in both
states the statutes elsewhere give the Ombudsman the power to determine the scope and manner of the investigation.
The agency actions causing grievances are enumerated through
five categories in subsection (a). The enumeration varies from state to
state with additions, deletions, and changes in language. The ABA
Model Statute list seems complete, and it would be difficult to give an
example of an act of an agency not covered in the statute, particularly
in view of the catch-all language of (5), which includes agency acts
that are "unreasonable, unfair, or otherwise objectionable, even
though in accordance with law." The ABA Model Statute in subsection (b) sets forth four reasons which give the Ombudsman discretion
to decline to investigate even though the act complained of comes
within subsection (a). Nebraska and Iowa also permit him to decline
jurisdiction, though for seven enumerated reasons which in both
statutes are substantially the same. 53 The Hawaii statute does not
have a similar provision. The first reason-the availability of another
remedy or channel-is found in the Iowa and Nebraska statutes, but
only the ABA Model Statute gives the complainant a helping hand if the
Ombudsman declines to investigate on this ground. Under (b)(1), the
Ombudsman must furnish the complainant with written instructions
on the procedural steps to be taken in connection with such other
remedy or channel. An Ombudsman may in practice do this, but it is
far better to have a statutory requirement that he do so. The other
three reasons given in (b)(2) to (4), inclusive, are found also in the Iowa
and Nebraska statutes. Both statutes also add other reasons, described
below, not given in the ABA Model Statute. With respect to a grievance pertaining to a matter outside of the power of the Ombudsman,
if the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction with respect to the complaint,
he has no other choice than to reject the complaint without investigation. As to lack of sufficient interest on the part of the complainant,
attention should be focused on the subject matter of the complaint not
on the person who brought the complaint, and a public-minded citizen
52. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-6 (Supp. 1974).
53. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,247 (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.12 (Supp. 1974).
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without any personal interest should be permitted to complain concerning an act of an agency. The reason that other complaints are
more worthy of attention would seem to be covered in the ABA Model
Statute under trivial or frivolous complaints. It should be noted that
the ABA Model Statute is unique in providing specifically that in the
event the Ombudsman decides not to investigate he shall refer the
complaint to the proper legislative committee and the Governor. Although it might be considered implicit within the Ombudsman's power
to investigate on his own motion that he would be permitted to inquire
into related matters where he declines a complaint, the ABA Model
Statute specifically spells out that the Ombudsman may proceed in this
situation. Both the Nebraska and Iowa statutes also contain specific
language permitting the Ombudsman, after his declining to investigate
a complaint, to proceed on his own motion to inquire into related
problems. 5 4 The Hawaii statute does not contain such specific language. However, section 96-6(b) does by implication give the same
power allowing the Ombudsman to proceed on his own motion to
inquire into related matters if he reasonably believes that an appropriate subject for investigation under section 96-8 exists.
M.

Section 13. Rights of ComplainantCommunication with Complainant
(a) AFTER THE OMBUDSMAN
HAS DECIDED
WHETHER OR NOT TO INVESTIGATE A COMPLAINT, HE SHALL SUITABLY INFORM THE COMPLAINANT.
(b) THE OMBUDSMAN SHALL, IF REQUESTED BY
THE COMPLAINANT, REPORT THE STATUS OF HIS
INVESTIGATION TO THE COMPLAINANT.
(c) AFTER INVESTIGATION OF A COMPLAINT, HE
SHALL SUITABLY INFORM THE COMPLAINANT OF
HIS CONCLUSION OR RECOMMENDATION AND, IF
APPROPRIATE, ANY ACTION TAKEN OR TO BE
TAKEN BY THE AGENCY INVOLVED.
(d) A LETTER TO THE OMBUDSMAN FROM A PERSON HELD IN CUSTODY-INCLUDING BY DETENTION, INCARCERATION AND HOSPITALIZATION-BY AN AGENCY SHALL BE FORWARDED
IMMEDIATELY, UNOPENED, TO THE OMBUDSMAN. A LETTER FROM THE OMBUDSMAN TO SUCH
PERSON SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY DELIVERED,
UNOPENED, TO THE PERSON.
(e) NO PERSON WHO FILES A COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO THIS ACT SHALL BE SUBJECT TO ANY
PENALTIES, SANCTIONS OR RESTRICTIONS IN
CONNECTION WITH HIS EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE
OF SUCH COMPLAINT.
54. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,247 (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.12 (Supp. 1974).
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COMMENT.
(a), (b) & (c) These sub-sections give the Ombudsman a general duty to inform the complainant of
the status of his complaint. The experience and judgment of the Ombudsman will determine the suitable
response to be made.
(e) This sub-section provides assurance that there
will be no reprisals for filing complaints.
Keeping the complainant informed is vital to the successful functioning of an Ombudsman office. Section 13 of the ABA Model Statute develops a consistent pattern of notification at three stages:
1. After the Ombudsman has decided whether or not to investigate a complaint. The Hawaii and Iowa statutes basically have the
same requirement.5 5 The ABA Model Statute does not impose the duty
to give reasons when the Ombudsman decides not to investigate as do
the Hawaii and Iowa statutes. Only the latter statute sets a time limit
for notification-60 days. The method of informing the complainant is
left to the discretion of the Ombudsman under the ABA Model Statute
(but it must be suitable) and the Hawaii statute. Only Iowa requires
the notice to be in writing.
2. On request of complainant, report status of investigation. The
Iowa statute imposes the same duty to report the status on request, but,
in addition, allows reports to be made "as appropriate," thus indicating the Ombudsman's discretion to report the status at any time. The
latter is implicit in the power found in the ABA Model Statute and the
three statutes to establish procedures discussed under section 11.
3. After investigation, inform complainant of conclusions or recommendation. The state statutes vary greatly from the ABA Model
Statute on this point. The Hawaii statute which covered stage one of
the possible stages of notification next requires notification of both the
Ombudsman's and the agency's action "[a]fter a reasonable time has
elapsed." 5 6 This writer assumes this time period to mean that notification be made after the Ombudsman has reported his opinion and
recommendations to the agency. Iowa's language mandates that "after completing his consideration of a complaint, whether or not it has
been investigated, the citizens' aide shall without delay inform the
complainant. . . . "57 The Nebraska statute is similar to Iowa's except
that the notification provision omits "without delay," although the
complainant must still be "suitably inform[ed]." 5 8 Informing the complainant of action taken by the agency is found only in the Hawaii law
and ABA Model Statute, the latter also including action to be taken by
the agency.
55.
56.
57.
58.

HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-7 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.13
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-14 (1968).

IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.13 (Supp. 1974).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,247 (Supp. 1969).

(Supp. 1974).
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One of the unique features of the Ombudsman concept is to
permit persons in custody (whether in prisons, hospitals, or other
institutions) to make complaints without fear of reprisal. The ABA
Model Statute, as does the Iowa law, supplies protection by insisting
that the mail be forwarded immediately and unopened to the Ombudsman from where a person is held in custody and from the Ombudsman back to that person. 5 9 The Hawaii statute protects only mail
going to the Ombudsman from the person in custody. 60 The Nebraska
statute does not contain any provision on this subject. However, the
Nebraska Ombudsman has indicated that the Nebraska Prison Administration does not censor incoming or outgoing mail between pris61
oners and the Ombudsman.

The ABA Model Statute protects an employee in private or public
employment from being subject to penalties, sanctions, or restrictions
in connection with his employment because he filed a complaint. Of
the three state statutes under review, only the Nebraska statute has a
provision relating to this type of discrimination, but limits the protec62
tion to state employees filing complaints.
N. Section 14. Rights of Agency
(a) IF THE OMBUDSMAN DECIDES TO INVESTIGATE A COMPLAINT, HE MAY, IF HE DEEMS IT
APPROPRIATE, SUITABLY INFORM THE AGENCY
INVOLVED.
(b) BEFORE ANNOUNCING OR REPORTING A CONCLUSION OR RECOMMENDATION THAT CRITICIZES OR IS ADVERSE TO AN AGENCY, THE OMBUDSMAN SHALL CONSULT WITH THAT AGENCY
AND PERMIT THE AGENCY REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO REPLY.
(c) IF ANY REPORT THAT HE ISSUES CRITICIZES
OR IS ADVERSE TO AN AGENCY, THE OMBUDSMAN SHALL INCLUDE ANY BRIEF STATEMENT THE AGENCY MAY PROVIDE.
COMMENT. (a), (b) & (c) These subdivisions insure
that the Ombudsman has the views of the affected
agency in mind to guard against oversight and bias.
Under (a) it is discretionary with the Ombudsman to
give notice to an agency before investigating a complaint
and such notice will depend upon whether it will aid or
hinder investigation; (b) further protects the agency by
giving it reasonable time to reply to criticism. (c) In his
special, general interim, and annual reports (§ 16), the
59. IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.14 (Supp. 1974).
60. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-18 (1968).
61. Frank, CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV., supra note 3, at 44.
62.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,254 (Supp. 1969).
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Ombudsman is required to provide the agency's rebuttal
(if any). Rather than permitting the Ombudsman to
summarize the agency's reply, the agency has been limited to a "brief" statement which shall be printed unedited (regulations as to what is "brief" might be promulgated under § 11(b)).
The success of the office of the Ombudsman depends upon the
independence, objectivity, competence, and fairness of the official. He
may be a watchdog for the people who will hold government accountable, but he is not an adversary. The investigation by an Ombudsman
must be impartial, and some degree of protection against erroneous
action by the Ombudsman is required. Rights of the agency are set
forth in section 14.
1. If the Ombudsman decides to investigate, he may, in his
discretion, notify the agency. The notice is required only to be "suitable" and, therefore, can be made by telephone, by letter, or in person.
If the Ombudsman is of the opinion that such notice would hinder his
investigation, he need not inform the agency involved. In Hawaii and
Iowa, the Ombudsman must notify the involved agency if he decides
to investigate. 63 No similar provision is found in the Nebraska statute.
However, both the Nebraska and Iowa statutes require the Ombudsman to notify the agency involved after the Ombudsman has
of the complaint, whether or not it has
completed his consideration
64
been investigated.
2. Before announcing or reporting a conclusion or recommendation that is critical or adverse to an agency, the Ombudsman must
consult with that agency and permit the agency reasonable opportunity
to reply. This right to consult and reply may be extended to individuals since it should be noted that the definition of agency in the ABA
Model Statute includes individuals as well as governmental entities.
Consultation is also required in the Hawaii, Iowa, and the Nebraska
statutes, 65 and the three state statutes have provisions for reply by the
66
agency as well.
3. If the Ombudsman issues any report that is critical of or
adverse to an agency, the report must include any brief reply made by
the agency. This same safeguard is found in the three state statutes. In
Hawaii, the publication of recommendations must include any agency
reply, and by implication so must any other report if it criticizes a
named agency. 67 Iowa, with great detail, specifically covers in three
63. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-7 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.13 (Supp. 1974).
64. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,247 (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G. 13 (Supp. 1974).
65. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-11 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.15 (Supp. 1974); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-8,248 (Supp. 1969).
66. HAWAI REV. STAT. § 96-13 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601G.15, .17, .18 (Supp.
1974); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,250, 251 (Supp. 1969).
67. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-13 (1968).
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sections the attaching8 of unedited replies unless excused by the agency
6
or official affected.
Section 15. Recommendations
(a) IF, AFTER INVESTIGATION, THE OMBUDSMAN
IS OF THE OPINION THAT AN AGENCY SHOULD:
(1) CONSIDER THE MATTER FURTHER,
(2) MODIFY OR CANCEL AN ACT,
(3) ALTER A REGULATION, PRACTICE, OR RULING,
(4) EXPLAIN MORE FULLY THE ACT IN QUESTION,
(5) RECTIFY AN OMISSION, OR
(6) TAKE ANY OTHER ACTION,
HE SHALL STATE HIS RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REASONS THEREFOR TO THE AGENCY. IF THE
OMBUDSMAN SO REQUESTS, THE AGENCY SHALL,
WITHIN THE TIME HE HAS SPECIFIED, INFORM
HIM ABOUT THE ACTION TAKEN ON HIS RECOMMENDATIONS OR THE REASONS FOR NOT COMPLYING WITH THEM. AFTER A REASONABLE
PERIOD OF TIME HAS ELAPSED, THE OMBUDSMAN
MAY ISSUE A REPORT.
(b) IF THE OMBUDSMAN BELIEVES THAT AN ACTION HAS BEEN DICTATED BY LAWS WHOSE RESULTS ARE UNFAIR OR OTHERWISE OBJECTIONABLE,_ AND COULD BE REVISED BY LEGISLATIVE
ACTION, HE SHALL BRING TO THE (INSERT NAME
OF LEGISLATIVE BODY)'S AND AGENCY'S NOTICE
HIS VIEWS CONCERNING DESIRABLE STATUTORY
CHANGE.
(c) IF THE OMBUDSMAN BELIEVES THAT ANY
PERSON HAS ACTED IN A MANNER WARRANTING
CRIMINAL OR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, HE
SHALL REFER THE MATTER TO THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES WITHOUT NOTICE TO THAT
PERSON.
0.

COMMENT.
(a) Though the Ombudsman will rarely have reason
to make a recommendation if he does not find an error in
what the agency has done or neglected to do, he should
remain free to suggest improvements in method or policy
even when the existing practice may be legally permissible. Thus he may facilitate one agency's learning about
and taking advantage of the experience of another. This
sub-section contemplates no entry of judgment, as it
were, but simply the expression of opinion by the Om68. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601G.15, .17,

.18 (Supp. 1974).
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budsman. He is not a superior official, in a position of
command. He cannot compel a change in an administrative act. His recommendation may, however, induce
an agency to exercise whatever power it itself may still
possess to right what the Ombudsman points out as a
past mistake.
(b) The Ombudsman's duty extends beyond simply
finding that an administrator acted in accord with existing statutory law; if the law itself produces unjust results, he should bring this to legislative notice. He is not
meant to be a general social reformer, but he does have
an obligation to take note of statutory provisions that
cause unexpectedly harsh administration.
(c) In Sweden the Ombudsman has power to prosecute miscreant officials. Here the Ombudsman has the
duty of forwarding pertinent allegations to the appropriate agency, civil service office, or the attorney general.
As such reporting might be construed under § 14(a) to
require informing the person of such allegations-which,
prematurely, might hinder adequate investigation-he is
empowered to do this without notice to the individual
involved. If the individual has testified before the Ombudsman, such testimony would bear the same privileges
as testimony in court (§ 18).
The ABA Model Statute makes it clear that the Ombudsman has
no power to give orders or make decisions or render judgments. His
weapons are the issuance of recommendations and reports. Section
15(a) deals with the Ombudsman's recommendations with reasons to
an agency after his investigation has led him to an opinion that the
agency should take action of the type described in section 15(a); all
possible action that the agency should take is included within this
section since it concludes with the catch-all that the Ombudsman may
find that the agency should "take any other action." There is no
requirement that an error be found before the Ombudsman can make
a recommendation since it is conceivable that an Ombudsman can find
no fault and yet be convinced that some action should be taken by the
agency. All three state statutes provide for recommendations to an
agency if the Ombudsman finds or believes that specified agency action
69
should be taken.
The wording of the described action varies from statute to statute,
but the only significant differences concern 15(a)(3) and (5) of the ABA
Model Statute. The recommendation by the Ombudsman to the
agency to alter "a regulation, practice, or ruling" becomes in the
Hawaii statute "[a] Statute or regulation," in the Iowa statute "[a]
rule," and in the Nebraska statute "a regulation or ruling." It should
69. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-12 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.16 (Supp. 1974); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-8,249(1) (Supp. 1969).
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be observed with respect to Hawaii's language that although an
agency cannot alter a statute, since alteration of statutes is a matter for
the legislators, conceivably it can recommend to the legislature a
change.
The approach of section 15(b) of the ABA Model Statute would
seem preferable since specific provisions are included to provide notice
of the needed change to the legislature and to the agency should the
Ombudsman find that a law needs to be altered. Only the ABA Model
Statute specifies actions recommended by the Ombudsman to the
agency for the rectification of an omission since the definition of "act of
an agency" in the ABA Model Statute includes "failure to act" and
"omission." It is also unique in requiring that recommendations be
accompanied by reasons. The Hawaii statute is similar to the ABA
Model Statute in requiring recommendations after investigation. The
Nebraska and Iowa statutes have a slightly different approach but the
result should be the same. Under the Nebraska statute and the Iowa
statute, a recommendation is made after the Ombudsman has considered the complaint and whatever material he deems pertinent. The
ABA Model Statute and the three state statutes under review do not
let the matter drop with the reporting of the recommendations to the
agency. All the statutes require the agency to notify the Ombudsman
of any action taken on his recommendations if the Ombudsman so
requests. 70 The ABA Model Statute, the Nebraska statute, and the
Hawaii statute permit the Ombudsman to specify the time within
which the agency shall notify him. Only the Iowa statute sets a specific
time deadline-20 working days. The Nebraska and the Iowa statutes
join the ABA Model Statute in requiring that if the agency decides not
to comply with the recommendations of the Ombudsman the agency
state the reasons.
The weapon of the recommendation is further sharpened in the
ABA Model Statute and in the three state statutes by permitting the
Ombudsman to publish his recommendations. Only the ABA Model
Statute and the Hawaii statute set forth that publication may occur
after a reasonable time has elapsed, meaning a reasonable time after
the recommendations to the agency or after the time specified for reply
if the Ombudsman has requested a reply. 71 There is no requirement in
the ABA Model Statute and the state statutes that publication of the
recommendations be made only if the Ombudsman deems the action
taken by the agency as inadequate and inappropriate.
The ABA Model Statute and the three state statutes do not
require that the publication of recommendations be mandatory, and
this is left to the discretion of the Ombudsman. If recommendations
are issued, the ABA Model Statute and two of the state statutes do
70. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-12 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.16 (Supp. 1974); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-8,249(1) (Supp. 1969).
71. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-13 (1968).
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require a wide distribution. 7 2 Under the ABA Model Statute,
section 16, the report must be distributed to the governor, to the
legislature, and to the public. The Ombudsman has the discretion to
have a wider distribution to legislative committees and to agencies.
The same general reasoning is applicable to the Nebraska statute at
section 81-8, 250 and the Iowa statute at section 601G. 17. The Hawaii
statute, section 96-13 is different since the Ombudsman may publish
his recommendations to any of the groups enumerated, the governor,
legislature, and the public. Since the Ombudsman has considerable
discretion, he can make the distribution narrow or wide. Hawaii,
therefore, does not require a wide distribution.
The ABA Model Statute takes the position that if the Ombudsman is of the opinion that agency action has been dictated by
existing laws whose results are unfair or otherwise objectionable and
the situation could be revised by legislative action, he is required to
bring this matter to the attention of the legislature and the agency and
to express his views concerning desirable statutory change. Somewhat
similar language is contained in the Nebraska and Iowa statutes except
there is no requirement that it be brought to the attention of the
agency. 73
It has previously been noted that generally the Ombudsman cannot prosecute in any jurisdiction with the exception of Sweden and
Finland, and even in these countries prosecution is infrequent. However, the ABA Model Statute does provide that if the Ombudsman
believes that any person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or
disciplinary proceedings, he must refer the matter to the appyopriate
authorities without notice to that person. The Nebraska and Iowa
statutes are in line with this general principle expressed, except that
Iowa refers to the Ombudsman's reporting of "any public official,
employee or other person" to the appropriate authorities and Nebraska
limits itself to the reporting of "any public officer or employee"; neither
state provides for reference to the authorities without notice to the
party. 74 Hawaii, on the other hand, limits referral to authorities on the
grounds of breach of duty or misconduct by an officer or employee of
75
an agency.
P.

Section 16.

Reports

THE OMBUDSMAN MAY FROM TIME TO TIME AND
SHALL ANNUALLY REPORT ON HIS ACTIVITIES TO
THE GOVERNOR, TO THE LEGISLATURE, OR ANY
OF ITS COMMITTEES, TO THE PUBLIC AND, IN HIS
DISCRETION, TO AGENCIES.
72. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-13 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.17 (Supp. 1974); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-8,250 (Supp. 1969).
73. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,249(2) (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G. 16 (Supp. 1974).
74. IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.19 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,252 (Supp. 1969).
75. HAWAH REV. STAT. § 96-15 (1968).
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COMMENT. Bringing his moves into the open is the
Ombudsman's sole means of gaining the public's support.
Under this section, he may publish his recommendations
in separate special reports or he may issue general interim reports in his discretion. The annual report, whose
release date would be set by the Ombudsman (Paragraph 11(b)) is mandatory. He need not identify individuals in his report (§ 1l(h)), but must reprint brief replies of
agencies which he criticizes (§ 14(c))..
The Ombudsman may make a number of reports, an essential
characteristic of his office. Three sections of the ABA Model Statute
are concerned with reports: Under section 11(b), the Ombudsman has
the power to develop rules and regulations for the discharge of his
duties, including the procedures for reporting his findings; under section 15(a), the Ombudsman is authorized to issue a report after he has
stated his recommendations to an agency; and under section 16, the
subject of reports is fully developed. The Ombudsman may from time
to time issue-reports with respect to his recommendations, special
reports, and general interim reports. However, an annual report is
mandatory. Under section 14(c), the Ombudsman must include in his
report any brief statement the agency may provide if he issues a report
which criticizes or is adverse to an agency.
The state statutes do not follow the ABA Model Statute in devoting a single section to the time and distribution of all reports. Generally, the three state statutes cover the publication of recommendations
in one section and the annual report in another. 7 6 Iowa and Nebraska
statutes imply that, as in the ABA Model Statute, the Ombudsman has
discretion to decide to issue reports of recommendations, special reports, and general interim reports since, in referring to the mandatory
annual report, the statutes indicate that this annual report is "[i]n
addition to whatever reports he may make from time to time."'7 7 The
publication of recommendations by the Ombudsmen in Hawaii, Iowa,
and Nebraska has been discussed under section 15.
It has been noted that annual reports are compulsory under the
ABA Model Statute and the three state statutes. Both the Iowa and
Nebraska statutes set a definite time for reporting: Iowa-by February
15th of each year; and Nebraska-on or about February 15th of each
year. The ABA Model Statute proceeds on the theory that the Ombudsman should be free to determine his own schedule for preparing
and filing his annual report, and the statute avoids deadlines which
may create problems.
As to the extent of distribution of the annual report, the widest
76. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 96-13, -16 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601G.17, .18 (Supp.
1974); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,250, 251 (Supp. 1969).
77. IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.18 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,251 (Supp. 1969).
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distribution is found in the ABA Model Statute-Governor, Legislature, any of its committees, the public, and, in the discretion of the
Ombudsman, agencies. The three state statutes vary: HawaiiLegislature and the public; Nebraska-Legislature and the Governor;
and Iowa-General Assembly and the Governor.
It has already been noted that under the ABA Model Statute, the
Ombudsman need not identify individuals in his reports (section 11(a)),
but must reprint brief replies of agencies which he criticizes (section
14(c)). Iowa and Nebraska in the section on annual reports provide
that the Ombudsman need not identify specific persons or agencies
(Iowa) or those immediately concerned (Nebraska) if to do so would
cause needless hardship. It should be noted that the Iowa statute
includes within this non-disclosure provision the identity of agencies.
It is difficult to understand why governmental entities should be
further protected since agency replies to criticism may be printed. The
provision in the ABA Model Statute that the Ombudsman must reprint in his reports brief replies of agencies which he criticizes has been
discussed under section 14(c). Iowa and Nebraska, in the sections on
the annual report, require the inclusion of replies if agencies or officials
are criticized; Iowa alone, however, requires the replies to be unedited
and eliminates inclusion of replies if excused by the agency or official
affected. Hawaii has no specific requirement that replies of agencies be
included in annual reports, although this could
be implied from the
78
section on publication of recommendations.
Q. Section 17. Ombudsman's Immunities
(a) NO PROCEEDING, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATION, OR REPORT OF THE OMBUDSMAN OR
MEMBER OF HIS STAFF SHALL BE REVIEWABLE IN
ANY COURT;
(b) THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS STAFF SHALL HAVE
THE SAME IMMUNITIES FROM CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITIES AS A JUDGE OF THIS STATE.
(c) THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS STAFF SHALL NOT
BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY OR PRODUCE EVIDENCE IN ANY JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDING WITH RESPECT TO ANY MATTER
INVOLVING THE EXERCISE OF THEIR OFFICIAL
DUTIES EXCEPT AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ENFORCE THIS ACT.
COMMENT. (a) Sub-section (a) precludes judicial review of the Ombudsman's work, unless, of course, he
has violated the Act.
(b) This sub-section avoids litigation and harassment by an uncooperative agency, but does not preclude
78. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 96-13, -16

(1968).
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prosecution for serious misconduct, or removal from
office (§ 8(a)).
(c) This sub-section acts with § 11(h) to protect the
secrecy and confidentiality of information obtained-in
order to instill public confidence in his work; it also
prevents unnecessary interruptions of his work to testify,
while allowing him to proceed in court whenever necessary (§ 11(i)).
Section 17(a) precludes judicial review of the proceedings, conclusions, recommendations, or reports of the Ombudsman or members of
his staff. Judicial review is likewise forbidden in the Nebraska statute
and the Hawaii statute except if in Hawaii the Ombudsman contravenes the provisions of the statute. 79 The Iowa law is silent on the
subject. It would seem to be implicit in the ABA Model Statute and
the Nebraska statute that if the Ombudsman violates the Ombudsman
statute his actions are subject to court review.
Section 17(b) further provides that the Ombudsman and staff shall
have the same immunities from civil and criminal liabilities as a judge
of the state. Somewhat similar language is used in the Hawaii statute
except staff are omitted. 80 Iowa provides for no civil action except
removal from office under Iowa law against the Citizens' Aide or his
staff unless an act or omission is actuated by malice or is grossly
negligent. 8 l There is no provision in the Nebraska statute with respect
to immunity from civil and criminal liabilities.
Section 17(c) specifically gives the Ombudsman and his staff immunity from being compelled to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial or administrative proceeding with respect to any matter involving the exercise of their official duties except such testimony or
evidence that might be necessary to enforce the Act. Somewhat similar
language is used in the Nebraska statute as to both judicial or administrative proceedings and in the Hawaii and Iowa statutes as to court
proceedings. 8 2 As written, the Ombudsman and his staff may voluntarily testify, but cannot be compelled to do so at least in the state
courts. It is the inability to compel the Ombudsman and his staff to
testify in the state courts which protects the confidentiality of the
information obtained by the Ombudsman. Application of the
privileged communication immunity by statute to the activities of the
Ombudsman is important to the Ombudsman office. However, it is
submitted that the state Ombudsman and his staff can be compelled to
testify in the federal courtssza-a problem which would have to be
79. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,253 (Supp. 1969); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-17 (1968).
80. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-17 (1968).
81. IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.20 (Supp. 1974).
82. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,253 (Supp. 1969); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-17 (1968); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 601G.20 (Supp. 1974).
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resolved by appropriate federal legislation. 8 3 That a complainthandling official appointed by, responsible to, and serving at the
pleasure of the executive has no immunity at all, is one of the reasons
the use of the term "Ombudsman" should be confined to those coming
within the definition given at the outset of this article.
R. Section 18. Witnesses' Privileges
ANY PERSON REQUIRED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION UNDER THIS ACT SHALL BE PAID THE SAME
FEES AND TRAVEL ALLOWANCES AND ACCORDED
THE SAME PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, INCLUDING RIGHT OF ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AS
WITNESSES WHOSE ATTENDANCE HAS BEEN REQUIRED IN THE
[NAME OF COURT]
COMMENT. Although nearly all testimony will be in
private and confidential, witnesses required to testify
(whether or not by subpoena) are given judicial
privileges and immunities. A provision that, "However,
a representative of an agency during business hours shall
not be entitled to such fees and allowances" might be
included to avoid possible' double payment of public
servants during working hours.
Protection of witnesses is provided for in the ABA Model Statute
and the statutes under review. The most sweeping provision is section
18 of the ABA Model Statute. The Nebraska statute states that a
witness required by subpoena to provide information has the same
privileges as mentioned above. 84 The Iowa statute grants the same
privileges whether or not the witness is compelled to testify by compulsory process except that officers and employees of an agency are not
entitled to fees and allowances. 85 The Hawaii statute has no provision
on witnesses' privileges. As previously noted, the Ombudsman has the
discretion to protect the identities of witnesses in the ABA Model
Statute and all the state statutes.
S. Section 19. Obstruction
ANY PERSON WHO WILLFULLY OBSTRUCTS OR
HINDERS THE PROPER AND LAWFUL EXERCISE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN'S POWERS, OR WILLFULLY
testify in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, Central Division, in
Warner S. Kelly v. Lou V. Brewer, Civil Action File No. 73-177-2. On a motion to quash the
subpoena on the ground that Mr. Cornell had a statutory immunity from being compelled to testify,
William C. Hanson, Chief Judge, overruled the motion on April 28, 1975. Subsequently the plaintiff
withdrew the subpoena on the ground that Mr. Cornell had agreed voluntarily to testify in the case in
camera.

83. See Frank, CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV., supra note 3, at 47-48.
84. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,245(4) (Supp. 1969).
85. IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.21 (Supp. 1974).
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MISLEADS OR ATTEMPTS TO MISLEAD THE OMBUDSMAN IN HIS INQUIRIES, SHALL BE SUBJECT
TO A FINE OF NOT MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($1,000.00).
COMMENT. Counsel must determine in each state
whether necessity exists for indicating the court in which
proceedings are to be brought and upon whose initiative.
Section 19 provides a penalty for obstruction of the Ombudsman's
activities and can be enforced under section 11(1) of the ABA Model
Statute. The same concept of a penalty is found in the three statutes
under review. 86 The Iowa statute is substantially the same, as is the
Nebraska statute except that it provides for the offense of a misdemeanor with a fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000) upon conviction.
The Hawaii statute has somewhat different language covering a person who willfully hinders the lawful actions of the Ombudsman or his
staff or willfully refuses to comply with their lawful demands; yet the
same monetary fines as the others may be imposed. This commentator
raises the question in the case of Hawaii whether an intentional refusal
of an agency to comply with recommendations of an Ombudsman,
which after all is a lawful demand, is a willful refusal to comply. The
ABA Model Statute language is preferred since this problem is
avoided.
T. Section 20. Relation to Other Laws
THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT ARE IN ADDITION
TO AND DO NOT IN ANY MANNER LIMIT OR AFFECT THE PROVISIONS OF ANY OTHER ENACTMENT UNDER WHICH ANY REMEDY OR RIGHT OF
APPEAL IS PROVIDED FOR ANY PERSON, OR ANY
PROCEDURE IS PROVIDED FOR THE INQUIRY INTO
OR INVESTIGATION OF ANY MATTER. THE POWERS CONFERRED ON THE OMBUDSMAN MAY BE
EXERCISED NOTWITHSTANDING ANY PROVISION
IN ANY ENACTMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT ANY
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION SHALL BE FINAL OR
UNAPPEALABLE.
Section 20 clearly sets forth that the Ombudsman office is a
supplemental remedy and is in addition to other remedies or rights of
appeal-a principle also covered in section one with respect to legislative purposes. This section also establishes the principle that the Ombudsman powers are not inhibited by statutory enactments providing
that any administrative action shall be final or unappealable. None of
the state statutes under review contain a similar provision.
86. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-19 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.22 (Supp. 1974); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-8,254 (Supp. 1969).

1975]

STATE OMBUDSMAN

LEGISLATION

U. Section 21. Appropriation
, OR SO MUCH THEREOF AS
THE SUM OF $
MAY BE NECESSARY, IS HEREBY APPROPRIATED
OUT OF THE GENERAL FUNDS OF THE STATE FOR
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING

-

FOR THE

PURPOSE OF CARRYING OUT THIS ACT.
COMMENT. This section should be included where
required by the fiscal regulations or practice of the state.
If inclusion of such section is not necessary, its omission
is recommended.
Although section 21 relates to appropriations, the comment to the
section states that if inclusion of such section is not necessary, its omission
is recommended. Only the Iowa statute as enacted had a provision with
respect to appropriation. In 1974, the Hawaii statute was amended to
provide that funds for the support of the Office of the Ombudsman shall
87
be provided for in the Act covering the expenses of the Legislature.
V. Section 22. Effective Date
THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY
UPON ENACTMENT.
COMMENT. The Act really becomes effective only
after appropriation has been made and an Ombudsman
has taken office.
It is, of course, obvious that the Act becomes operational only
after appropriation has been made and an Ombudsman has taken
office. In Nebraska, the Public Counsel Bill was approved by the
Governor on June 29, 1969. The unicameral legislature elected Murrell
B. McNeil as Public Counsel on May 5, 1971, and he took office on
June 1, 1971. The law in Hawaii became effective on June 24, 1967.
Herman S. Doi was appointed Ombudsman on April 17, 1969, and
took office July 1, 1969. In Iowa, the Citizens' Aide Statute was signed
by the Governor on April 20, 1972. Lawrence Carstensen, who had
been serving since October 1, 1970, as Citizens' Aide, an office created
by the Governor, was appointed as Citizens' Aide under the statute
and took office as the statutory Citizens' Aide on July 1, 1972.
W. Section 23. Severability
IF ANY PART OF THIS ACT SHALL BE DECLARED
INVALID, ALL OTHER PARTS SHALL REMAIN IN
FULL FORCE AND EFFECT; THE PROVISIONS OF
THIS ACT ARE DECLARED TO BE SEVERABLE.
No discussion need be made on this section, which is not contained in any of the state statutes under review.
87. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 96-3 (Supp. 1974).
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CONCLUSION

State legislators concerned with the drafting of Ombudsman legislation have various guides to follow: the Gellhorn, the Harvard, and
the ABA Model Statutes as well as the Hawaii, Nebraska, and Iowa
laws. The latest of these-the joint project of the Ombudsman Committee, Section of Administrative Law, American Bar Association, and
the Yale Law School Legislative Services-built on the foundations of
the Gellhorn product and conforming to the twelve essentials of the
American Bar Association Ombudsman resolution is the most complete and thorough. It represents the work product of law students,
lawyers, law professors, and Ombudsman experts. It has frequently
been pointed out by commentators that "since the Ombudsman is
easily adaptable to the differing needs of various countries, each nation
has made its Ombudsman to its own fashion." ' 88 The same statement
would apply to states or, for that matter, regions and provinces. But in
the United States there is no reason that a state-wide Ombudsman
statute should differ from the twelve essentials of the ABA resolution.
The ABA Model Statute puts the requisite flesh on to the skeleton of
the resolution, but it must be, if necessary, adjusted to meet the needs
and requirements of a particular state. The 1974 International Bar
Association-American Bar Association Ombudsman Committees Development Report shows that the strongest surge toward the Ombudsman system is at the state, region, and province level: Australia
(States of South Australia, Queensland, Victoria, Western Australia,
and New South Wales), Canada (Provinces of Alberta, Manitoba,
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Quebec, and Saskatchewan), Federal
Republic of Germany (State of Rhineland-Palatinate), India (States of
Bihar, Maharashtra and Rajasthan), Italy (Region of Tuscany), and
the United States (Hawaii, Iowa, and Nebraska). 89 The United States
with only three states out of fifty runs far behind Australia and
Canada where a majority of the states or provinces have Ombudsmen
in office. But the score card in the United States shows a flood of
Ombudsman proposals into the state legislative houses. 90 This torrent
shows the concern of some state legislators to create an institution that
will help to adjust the complaints of aggrieved citizens against the
bureaucracy of the modern state. The majority of the legislators do not
yet understand that to protect the individual against administrative
mistake and abuse of power more is needed than the existing
remedies-the courts, the legislatures, the executive, the administrative courts, and the administrative agencies. They do not yet understand that only the legislature can provide an independent and impar88. Frank, AD. L. REV., supra note 3, at 477.
89. IBA-ABA OMBUDSMAN COMM. DEVELOPMENT REP. 2-21 (1973-1974).
90. ABA OMBUDSMAN COMM., DEVELOPMENT REP. (1971-1972, 1972-1973).
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tial office with responsibility to the legislature as an aid in its functions
of supervising the executive branch and the administrative agencies. 9 1
91. Publications that would be helpful to an understanding of the Ombudsman concept on
the state level, in addition to those previously mentioned in this article, are the following: S. V.
ANDERSON, OMBUDSMAN PAPERS: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND PROPOSALS (1969); ESTABLISHING OMBUDSMAN OFFICES: RECENT EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (S. V. Anderson & J.

Moore eds. 1972); W.

GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN THE
NINE COUNTRIES (1966); OMBUDSMEN FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT? (S. V. Anderson ed.

1968); THE OMBUDSMAN: CITIZEN'S DEFENDER (D. Rowat ed. 2d ed. 1968); D. ROWAT, THE
OMBUDSMAN PLAN: ESSAYS ON THE WORLDWIDE SPREAD OF AN IDEA; A. WYNER, THE
NEBRASKA OMBUDSMAN: INNOVATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT (1974); The Ombudsman or
Citizen's Defender: A Modern Institution, 377 ANNALS

1 (1968).

